Vaishali Institute Research Bulletin 1

Author(s): Nathmal Tatia
Publisher: Research Institute of Prakrit Jainology & Ahimsa Mujjaffarpur

Page 106

FALLACIES
95 of another person are not easily accessible to an outsider)".1 (vii) The seventh fallacy of example is found in the case of the reversed statement of the probans and the probandum, e. g., 'Whatever is noneternal is a product'. It should be stated as 'Whatever is a product is non-eternal'. (viii) The eighth fallacy under question is found when the concomitance in agreement is not set forth in the example. This has been illustrated before (p. 91) from the Nyayapraveśa. The fallacy consists in the omission of the proof of necessary concomitance and not in the unemployment of such expressions as 'all', 'whatever' and the like. In Indian logic the necessary concomitance must be an acknowledged matter of fact, that is to say, must be based on material truth. Mere formal consistency as required in formal logic is not deemed sufficient.
The two other varieties, namely want of necessary concomitance (ananvaya) and the reversal of necessary concomitance (viparitānvaya) are also set forth by Dharmakirti in the Nyayabindu. The example of the first is 'Whoever is a speaker is subject to attachment like a specified person'. It lacks in necessary concomitance, though they are found together in the person concerned. The second is illustrated in the following statement of necessary concomitance reversewise 'Whatever is impermanent is a product'. The concomitance holds between the probandum and the probans, and this is reversed in the above proposition.
Though Hemacandra adopts all the instances and illustrations from the Nyāyabindu, he does not set out these two cases as instances of fallacious example. He does not differ from Dharmakirti in respect of the propriety of the two cases in the context, but he asserts that these two cases are covered by the types and instances stated by him.
Our author Siddhasena Divakara does not specify instances. They are supplied by the commentator. The commentator does not recognize the three varieties of fallacies, namely lack of positive concomitance, undemonstrated concoinitance in agreement, and the reversal of such concomtiance as recognized by Dharmakirti and Hemacandra. He opines that these are not cases of false example because an example by itself is not competent to prove the probandum It is the necessary concomitance which can deliver the goods. They are rather cases of fallacious reasons and not of examples. As regards the reversal of the concomitance and non-demonstration of it, they are rather
1. A critique of Organ of Knowledge, p. 155.