Vaishali Institute Research Bulletin 1

Author(s): Nathmal Tatia
Publisher: Research Institute of Prakrit Jainology & Ahimsa Mujjaffarpur

Page 101

90. VAISHALI INSTITUTE RESEARCH BULLETIN NO. I another (satpratipakşa). The example of the first is 'Fire is not-hot because it is a product like a jar?. The probandum ‘not-hot' is contradicted by tactual perception. The Buddhist and the Jaina logicians do not regard them fallacies of reason but as fallacies of thesis. The proposition 'The fire is not-hot' is not a thesis proper since it is contradicted by a perception, an accredited organ of valid cognition. As for the countervailed probans, i. e., one which has an equally competent rival proving the opposite of what is supposed to be proved by the first probans, both Dharmakirti and Hemacandra and other logicians of the Jaina school who are Hemacandra's predecessors and successors, do not lend countenance to such a fallacy. It is not possible that a valid probans can be countervailed by other reason, valid or invalid. Dharmakirti however recognizes the tradition which is confined to two contradictory positions maintained by different philosophers. It cannot have any scope in cases of accredited valid probantia.'
The assertion of the definition of unproved probans of Siddhasena Divākara is rather too wide. Hemacandra points out that indecision, doult and error are not possible in a valid cognition; when these contingencies occur they will suffice to prove that the cognition in question is invalid. Doubt or error or indecision are rather defects of valid cognition in general and not of any particular species of it He therefore gives the definition of unproved or non-existent probans (asiddha) as follows:
"The non-existent probans arises from lack of proof or doubt of its existence, according as the reason assigned is found to be nonexistent and lacking in necessary concomitance, or lacking in definite proof of its existence as well as necessary concomitance."
The fallacy called 'non-existent probans' arises when there is no proof of its existence, that is to say, when the reason is found to be nonexistent and to lack in necessary concomitance; in other words, when the reason is found to be non-existent eo ipso. "Word is perishable, since it is visible'' is a typical instance. It must not be supposed that it is called non-existent, since it is not a necessary attribute of the subject and so the author adds the phrase 'found to lack in necessary concomi. tance' (to rebut the prevailing misconception). The reason is 'nonexistent' not because it is not the attribute of the subject, but because it lacks in necessary concomitance which is the sole and sufficient) characteristic of valid probans. It is not the necessary characteristic of
1. Cf. Nyayabbindu, III. 110 ff. (concerned with viruddhāvyabhicãrin). 2. A Critique of Organ of Knowledge, p. 144.