Book Title: Vaishali Institute Research Bulletin 1
Author(s): Nathmal Tatia
Publisher: Research Institute of Prakrit Jainology & Ahimsa Mujjaffarpur

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Page 93
________________ 82 VAISHALI INSTITUTE RESEARCH BULLETIN NO. I who has to be convinced of the necessary concomitance ab initio and the argument will be effective only after the education of the respondent in necessary concomitance. Considered from every possible point of view the tagging of example to the universal proposition is found to be an otiose appendix which is rather a survival of blind tradition. A similar line of argument has been followed by Hemacandra in the Pramāņamīmāmsă.' It is therefore concluded that the necessary concomitance is apprehended inside the subject and no example is required for the purpose. Of the five members of syllogism, the first three, viz , the thesis, the probans and the illustration stating the universal concomitance with an example tagged on to it, have been considered by the author. The other two members, viz., "application' (upanaya) and “conclusion', and their corroborative proofs have not been taken into consideration. 'The author is not writing a standard book on logic and so he has avoided details which are not necessary conditions of inference. An intelligent student can infer these facts on the strength of his knowledge of what has been stated in the text here. The omission of these members which are endorsed in the Nya yasūtra of Akşhapada is due to the author's adoption of the middle path of discussion. There are three forms of syllogistic arguments current in the logical tradition of India : (i) the briefest, (ii) moderate and (iii) elaborate. The first only endorses the second member stating the probans which is regarded as sufficient for the purpose of a knowledgeable person who is posted in the univerral concomitance and therefore immediately infers the probandum. The second form is sufficient for a mediocre and the third is resorted to for the enlightenment of a person of slow understanding in whose case the statement of all the ten members is found necessary for his enlighten ment. Hemacandra does not find fault in the contention that the knowledge of the probandum is secured by internal concomitance. But he justifies the citation of example in special circumstances. We quote his observation : "That (i, e. the example) is the locus of the apprehension of necessary concomitance. Now it may be urged, if example is not a condition of inference (on your view), why should you take the trouble of propounding definition of the same. The answer is : (It is in pursuance of the recognition of) illustration which will be allowed for as a case of 1. Ibid, (Singhi Granthamāla edition), 1-2-72. See also A Critique of Organ of Knowledge. Jain Education International For Private & Personal Use Only www.jainelibrary.org

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