Vaishali Institute Research Bulletin 1

Author(s): Nathmal Tatia
Publisher: Research Institute of Prakrit Jainology & Ahimsa Mujjaffarpur

Page 69

58 VAISHALI INSTITUTE RESEARCH BULLETIN NO. Í cognitions are wrong in respect of their object. But we differ from it since its validity is asserted beyond doubt. This assertion of validity of the realist may be regarded as futile so far as the idealist is concerned. The latter does not admit the validity of perception and so the mere assertion of validity cannot carry conviction to him. But the assertion of validity is reinforced by the consideration that a valid cognition cannot be erroneous since it is the means of the apprehension of an objective fact and as such it must be regarded as an organ of valid knowledge. The idealist also cannot repudiate its validity since he concedes its validity in the empirical plane. The distinction between empirical and transcendental truth is only dictated by a pre-conception which is not proved by experience. The Jaina realist asserts that to say that an organ of valid cognition is invalid involves contradiction in terms, since his first assertion that perception is a valid cognition is contradicted by a subsequent statement that it is erroneous and invalid. The empirical validity is true in the plane of experience which is said to be valid because of its pragmatic success. Verification which is the test of validity according to the realist is nothing but a case of one cognition being confirmed by another. The objective reference as has been said by the idealist is only the outcome of false dispositions which are the legacy of nescience.
The idealist contends that the realist's objection is too naive to assail the profound philosophical truth of the idealist's position. The assertion that perception and inference are valid organs (pramana) is a provisional concession to the popular faith which is incompetent to envisage the distinction between absolute truth and practical empirical truth. The validity of perception and inference is conceded on the ground that their deliverence leads to the attainment of the object envisaged. But this verification is confined to the empirical plane which is only a false appearance. The idealist makes this concession out of compassion for the deluded persons. And when they are persua. ded of the relative validity of the cognitive organs, and their false pre-conceptions regarding the reality of the phenomenal world of plurality are weakened by powerful arguments, and their belief in the validity of the cognitive organs is shown to be inspired by superstition, they are made capable of receiving final enlightenment.
The ultimate invalidity of empirical knowledge is asserted from the point of view of ultimate transcendental truth of pure consciousness bereft of subject object bifurcation. The invalidity of these empirical organs of knowledge is also proved by the consideration of the untena. bility of external objects supposed to be cognized by them.