Vaishali Institute Research Bulletin 1

Author(s): Nathmal Tatia
Publisher: Research Institute of Prakrit Jainology & Ahimsa Mujjaffarpur

Page 85

74
VAISHALI INSTITUTE RESEARCH BULLETIN NO. I VAISHALL
theorem which propounds the proposition to be proved by argument before the council consisting of the president, judges, and the debating parties both proponent and opponent. The argument of the proponent is introduced by the statement of the thesis in which the logical subject is qualified tentatively by the predicate as one that is to be established to the satisfaction of the council This initial statement has a logical necessity in that it sets forth the logical subjecs as the locus of the probans to ke adduced. The logical necessity of the explicit statement of the thesis has been called in question by a few logicians such as Dignāga and his followers. It has been shown in the Nya yasūtra that a syllogistic argument consists of five members of which the statement of the thesis or the proposition mooted for proof (called pratijña or pakşa), is the first. Dignaga, Dharmakirti and their followers have criticized this member as unnecessary and redundant. According to Kumārila Bhatta, the first or the last three propositions fully meet the purpose of the argument, namely, the establishment of the conclusion i. e., the vindication of the thesis. Dharmakīrti goes one step further and observes that only the premises (i) the ud aharana setting out the universal concomitance, and the minor premise are quite adequate and the statement of the conclusion involves unnecessary repetition since a person who understands the two premises will necessarily understand the conclusion irresistibly following from them.
But as we have observed in the course of the elucidation of verse xii, the commentator justifies Divákara's statement and also incidently the five members and the five corroborating statement (suddhi) as necessarily helping the person addressed to understand the issue. One may complain that this defence is inspired by pragmatic consideration of convenience. Their value is more psychological than logical. But the author agrees to differ from the Buddhist critic so far as the first member of the syllogism is taken into account. Now let us cite concrete examples. “The hill is on fire' (parvato vahnimān), 'All things are indeterminate' (sarvam anekanta tmakam) i. e. to say, they cannot be determined or restricted to a particular determination, being possessed of infinitely multiple phases and attributes according to the Jaina. These are instances of the thesis (pakşa) which are to be established by adducing fitting reason, i, e., probanses. Now the probans assigned must have a subject (dharmin) to belong to. But how can the subject be known without the statement of the thesis ? Of co it may be considered that the respondent may understand the su from the context. But this cannot be assumed as a matter of rule. In sollogistic argument one should not take anything for granted,