Vaishali Institute Research Bulletin 1

Author(s): Nathmal Tatia
Publisher: Research Institute of Prakrit Jainology & Ahimsa Mujjaffarpur

Page 72

DUALITY OF COGNITION AND OBJECT
61 condemnation of all perceptions on the ground of some perception being erroneous does not bespeak a healthy attitude. Verification is the proof of the validity of perception or inference. There is of course verification in dream experience, but that is not accepted as proof because dream experience is false from end to end. If we probe deeply the nature of the dream or illusion we shall find that even in dream we do not come across a datum which has not been seen in wakeful state. The contradiction by a philosophical pre-conception which is neither verifiable nor unverifiable should be kept apart from the province of logic. The Jaina realist does not maintain that metempirical truth necessarily contradicts empirical truth. All experiences should therefore be accepted as valid unless they are set aside by a contradictory experience or incontestable logical consideration. Whatever may be the case there is a sharp line of demarcation between error and truth, and error is only a false imitation of truth, otherwise it will lack its capacity for deception. But an accredited organ of valid cognition cannot be dubbed as erroneous except when it is set. aside by contradiction. The discovery of error is of the nature of direct experience in majority of cases and if the validity of the latter is impeached, there will be no distinction between valid and invalid cognition.
Text
sakalapratibhasasya bhräntatvasiddhitaḥ sphutam/ pramāpam svānyaniścāyi dvayasiddhau prasidhyati //
Translation “From the consideration of the failure to prove the erroneousness of all (each and every case of) cognitions, it is obvious that a valid cognition which is cognizant of its own self and another (object) can take place if the two (poles) are established (as verities).” ... (VII)
Elucidation The Buddhist philosopher who propounds the thesis that all cognitions are erroneous can establish his position by adducing some proof, preferably inference in support of his contention Now if th supporting proof be false coming as it does under the category of cognition, he will fail to establish his position. If on the other hand the supporting argument is admitted to be true it will involve him in self-contradiction. The admission of the validity of one case of cogni. tion will perforce entail that of similar cognition. The dichotomy of cognition as such into metempirical and empirical classes is also to be proved by a valid cognition. So the blanket assertion of invalidity of