Vaishali Institute Research Bulletin 1

Author(s): Nathmal Tatia
Publisher: Research Institute of Prakrit Jainology & Ahimsa Mujjaffarpur

Page 42

KINDS OF VALID COGNITION
and extra-perceptual (parokşa) and of objects as perceptible (pratyaksa) and imperceptible (parokşa) is relative to the knowing subject whose capacity for cognition is circumscribed by the veil of ignorance induced by the past karma of the percipient.
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It has been shown that this classification is relative to the knowing subject to whom many things are imperceptible or, to be precise, do not fall within his range of perception. The knowledge of such an unperceived object is secured by inference or verbal testimony of a person of unquestioned veracity and unimpaired capacity who has first-hand cognition of those things which are for the present imperceptible to this specific person.
The materialist Cārvāka does not believe in the validity of extraperceptual cognition, inference and the like, But this scepticism of Carvāka is self-stultifying as it involves self-contradiction. As has been shown by Dharmakirti whose position has been endorsed by the Jaina and other philosophers that the very refutation of the rival thinker who asserts inference as valid cognition presupposes the belief of the Carvāka in the validity of inference. How can he know that another person entertains the view that inference is as valid as perception? Certainly the thought of another person cannot be known by perception of the sceptic who does not pretend to such occult power. A denial presupposes affirmation. And the denial of the validity of inference necessarily takes for granted the affirmation of such validity by another person. In fact no debate is possible if know. ledge of the other person is not subject to dispute. As this knowledge cannot be secured by ordinary perception, extra-perceptual cognition has to be posited as a matter of logical necessity. Furthermore the Materialist who believes only in the validity of direct perceptual knowledge alone cannot distinguish false perception from true perception. A man who has suffered from the illusion of water in the desert regards the appearence of water in the same situation on a subsequent occasion as false beforehand. Why should it be held to be false before actual verification ? The sceptic must answer that it is exactly similar to the previous illusion he perceived before. This is a case of inference on the basis of exact similarity or identity (tadatmya) as the Buddhist terminology goes. Exact similarity means identitiy in apparent difference.
This cognition of falsity on the basis of identity with previous illusion is nothing but inferential in character. Again how does the sceptic know that the other party holds the opposite view which he