Vaishali Institute Research Bulletin 1

Author(s): Nathmal Tatia
Publisher: Research Institute of Prakrit Jainology & Ahimsa Mujjaffarpur

Page 54

PURPOSE OF DEFINITION
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is secured by another valid cognition or not, it is a case of petitio principii or non sequitur. Valid cognition is known by itself and is self-proved. 1 So the question of another valid cognition to certify its validity does not arise. Definition does not seek to establish anything new but serves to exorcize the ghost of superstition and error from the minds of pretenders to knowledge and for the enlightenment of persons of poor intellect. That such a procedure is sanctioned by philosophical tradition and logical necessity will be apparent from the consideration of the negative inference based on non-perception of a perceivable fact. It has been shown by Dharmakirti that such judgement as there is no jar on the ground' is and ought to be secured by the perception of empty locus. The perception of the locus with other contents save and except the jar is tantamount to the perception of the absence of the jar. But there may be persons who fail to have this intuition owing to the dullness of their intellect or the false notion fostered by wrong theory. The syllogistic inference, 'The jar is not existent on the ground surface, because it is not perceived in spite of the presence of the full conditions of perception and its competency to be perceived' serves to remove doubt about the jar. The case of the definition of valid cognition is perfectly on a par with the situation. The definition serves, as has been repeatedly observed, to emancipate the victim of wrong tradition or ignorance induced by dull understanding, from the wrong notions.
As for the contention of Nagarjuna whether the defining character is identical with or different from the object proposed to be defined, and if the former is different from the latter, it will be destitude of the characteristic per se, and if identical the two will be a futile dichotomy, it will suffice to observe that the Jaina philosopher holds that the
1. Both the Buddhist and Jaina lozicians hold that validity is known in
unwonted instances of cognition by verification (artha-kriya-samvāda). But the verification is known to be valid by itself and so also Belf-intuition of cognition. A cognition is known by itself not only as existent but also as valid. Inference which is determined by the assured conviction of the necessary concomitance is not liable to doubt and hence its validity is known by itself. So far as valid cognition (pramāņa) is concerned, it is known by itself and its validity is not questionable. But a doubt arises on account of the different conceptions of validity set forth in divergent definitions proposed by rival philosophers. Here mere verification does not suffice. A scientific assessment is necessary for resolving the differences which are the outcome of false notions. Here a scientific treatise is required to dispel the false notion. The arguments of Siddhasena Divākara are perfectly the same. Vide Com. of Manorathanandi on Pramānavārtika, I. 7.