Vaishali Institute Research Bulletin 1

Author(s): Nathmal Tatia
Publisher: Research Institute of Prakrit Jainology & Ahimsa Mujjaffarpur

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VAISHALI INSTITUTE RESEARCH BULLETIN NO. I
Buddhist. The denial of the object as unreal will make all our experience unreal and false. If one's experience of the object be suspect there is no ground for preferential treatment of cognition. The consequent deadlock and universal blindness will equally follow the denial of the object as it is alleged to follow on the denial of cognition. So it must be admitted on the strength of experience, that a valid cognition cannot arise without reference to the object. We have already discussed the untenability of the postulation of pre-disposition (vāsanā) in our elucidation of the first verse. So we do not elaborate the argument further as it will only result in repetition.
Let us now examine the purport of the definition of perceptual and extra-perceptual cognition as apprehension of an (external) object. Here apprehension should be understood as definite and determinate cognition without which the object will not be determined as known. Perceptual cognition has been determined as determinate cognition of the nature of certitude. But Dharmakirti's definition of perceptual cognition as one devoid of conceptual knowledge and unerroneous is opposed to this interpretation. Though Dharmakirti is an intellectual giant, his definition is not supported by reason. We now set forth the arguments adduced by the Buddhist in support of the thesis that perceptual cognition is indeterminate and hence repugnant to the association of concepts.
It is argued by the Sautrantikas that perceptual cognition is generated by the object standing ahead which is possessed of causal efficiency. The external object is a fact which is bereft of words and it gives rise to perceptual cognition endowed with its form. So such cognition which takes stock of the specific particular object should not be associated with words as there is no cause of such verbal expression. For instance visual perception cognizes an object but not the word expressive of it. Perceptual cognition therefore should take stock of the object per se. If it is supposed to wait for the association of a word expressive of it (object) that will make apprehension of the object impossible. Without apprehending the object one cannot remember the word expressive of it (object) and so one cannot associate the word with the object which can be known only by recollection. Without such association of words which mean only generalized concepts, the visual perception cannot take place according to your assertion that perceptual cognition is determinate and definite certitude which can only be secured by a conceptual and verbal judgement. But as there is no cause for such verbal conceptual association with the particular object envisaged, perceptual cognition will not