Vaishali Institute Research Bulletin 1

Author(s): Nathmal Tatia
Publisher: Research Institute of Prakrit Jainology & Ahimsa Mujjaffarpur

Page 56

PERCEPTUAL AND EXTRA-PERCEPTUAL COGNITION
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since it will be a case of mutual dependence (anyonyaśraya) or logical seesaw: perceptual (immediate) cognition is not one that is extra-perceptual (mediate) and the latter is one that is not perceptual. Both presuppose one another. Therefore it has been interpreted as what is directly envisaged by Siddharşi. It is a determinate cognition and not indeterminate as the Buddhist maintains. It is for this purpose that the adjective idrśam (as such) is added. The assertion that perception is of the nature of cognition is significant and shows the difference of Jaina logician from those of Samkhya and Nyāya schools. The Samkhya defines perception as the transformation of the senses into the form of the objects to be perceived by them. But the senses are in their term the transformation of primodial matter (prakrti) and as such the operations of the senses are also material and unconscious, and consequently they cannot be supposed to take cognizance of the external object. If it is argued that it is the condition of such cognizance and therefore is called pramana, that will be to no purpose. It will extend to the other conditions such as light, space, etc., which are also the conditions of perception. It is maintained that it is not the material change but the same when illumined by the light of consciousness is cognizant of the object. But this practically amounts to the admission that perceptual cognition qua result or qua condition is a form of consciousness. This is the Jaina position. The predicative adjective cognition of an object is inserted in order to combat the Vijñānavādin who denies the existence of external objects. The denial of an external object is not however justifiable as the cognition and its external referent are equally felt facts. This form of subjectivism would annul the distinction of cognition from the cognizable object and thus will lay the axe at the root of logic and epistemology. The Buddhist idealist may plead : “My withers are unwrung. I do not believe in the ultimacy of logical and epistemological procedures They are simply convenient devices for pragmatic, empirical thought. The ultimate reality is subject-objectless consciousness”. The realists of all schools have entered their protests against this blanket condemnation of thought-activity. It is held by the realist that our cognitions of external objects are real and valid, and cannot be scouted as objective aberrations. If cognition of an external object be rejected as false subjective projection why should not this doubt also assail the validity of cognition itself. Cognition and its content are both intuited with equal clearness and vividness, and so they should swim or sink together. The Buddhist argues that cognition as a felt fact cannot be denied its reality and validity because that will make the whole world unknown and unknowable. This is against experience. But this very contention will boomerang on the