Vaishali Institute Research Bulletin 1

Author(s): Nathmal Tatia
Publisher: Research Institute of Prakrit Jainology & Ahimsa Mujjaffarpur

Page 48

NATURE OF VALID COGNITION
latter may be subsumed under inference. Even the verbal testimony is based on the relation of word and meaning. This relation, whatever may be the speculations on its character and origin, is a necessary relation so far as we are concerned. That a word denotes a particular meaning and that again by virtue of a relation which is not susceptible to alteration by us is admitted on all hands. This relation is a fait accompli and this is asserted in the Vartika of Katyayana on Paninisütra viz, siddhe sabdartha-sambandhe. The meaning of a word is fixed and must be accepted without demur. You cannot call in question the factuality of this relation of denotation between word and meaning in the same way as you cannot deny the relation between cause and effect. If the independence of such a relation is recognized and its necessity is accepted, Siddharși asserts that all kinds of extra-perceptual knowledge are susceptible of comprehension under inference.1 In other words extra-perceptual cognition and inference will be regarded at synonymous. The treatment of extra-perceptual cognitions like üha (reasoning), sabda (verbal testimony), upamana (comparison) and pratyabhijña (reccognition) as separate sub-species has been dictated by the consideration of the divergence of opinion either on their validity or their separate status. If extra-perceptual cognition were alone stated, the doubt about the validity of these sub-species would not make them clearly intelligible. The difference of views on particular kinds of extra-perceptual cognition is unresolvable because the philosophers of different schools stubbornly cling to their tradition. Comparison, for instance, has been subsumed under perceptual cognition by the Jaina and some other logicians whereas the Naiyāyika and Mīmāmsaka would insist upon their separate status. There is a necessary reference to the past datum and if the emphasis is placed on this element it would be difficult to reduce it to perception. Similar is the case with recognition. There are two discernible elements in it, the recollection of the past datum and the perception of the present. The Jaina logician gives prominence to the recollection as a component and hence place it under extra-perceptual cognition. The Naiyayika, on the other hand, lays greater stress on the perception of the present datum and thinks that the memory of the past datum is submerged in the perceptual cognition. There is thus a reasonable basis for divergence of views which is due to the logical and psychological proclivities of the thinkers.
As we have observed before, the division of valid cognition into two classes, perceptual and extra-perceptual, is rather dictated by
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1. yadi punaḥ sadhyarthānyathanupapannahetusampa ditamanumanamişyeta,... parokgarthavigayapratiter abhāvāditi, p. 25.