Book Title: Vaishali Institute Research Bulletin 1 Author(s): Nathmal Tatia Publisher: Research Institute of Prakrit Jainology & Ahimsa MujjaffarpurPage 45
________________ 34 VAISHALI INSTITUTE RESEARCH BULLETION NO. I that perception is not competent for negation. Besides perception depends on the operation of senses and sense cannot operate on negation for want of a plausible relation. The knowledge of negation arises when one sees a particular object and remembers its opposite (pratiyogin) independently of the sense-object-contact. So knowledge of negation is non-perceptual and as it cannot be reduced to inference or verbal testimony, it must be recognised as a different species of cognition. The Naiyāyika contends that negation of a perceptible ect is realised by sense-perception directly and abruptly. As for the contention of Kumarila that there is no relation between negation and sense, and between negation and the locus, the Naiyāyika pleads that the relation is sui generis. It is a substantive-a djective relation. The Jaina logician on the other hand maintains that when the sense is in touch with the empty locus, it cognizes negation which is a component factor of the positive locus. The debate between Kumārila and other logicians on this point is too elaborate to be succinctly treated. Each party will stick to his position and not be willing to capitulate. The number of types of valid cognition is a popular subject matter among the philosophers. There is however a general consensus regarding perception, inference and verbal testimony. But the Buddhist refuses to believe in the intrisic validity of verbal testimony on the ground that a word does not stand in objective relation to its meaning. The relation is rather imposed by convention and as such is not objective. The Jaina along with other respectable philosophers believes that relation between word and meaning is not entirely conventional or entirely natural, but one that partakes of both. No do ubt the speaker or the auditor can understand the meaning of word only if he had the knowledge of the convention. But convention is not entirely arbitrary or accidental. The word must not be repugnant to the meaning signified by it. This stand disposes of the objection of Dharmakīrti that there is no compelling relation like causality or identity of essence. A third necessary relation is not conceivable. The relation of denoter and denoted (vācyavā cakabhāva) is only conventional and ultimately depends upon the option of the original speaker. Here the Jaina joins issue with Dharmakit ti and offers certain convincing observations in support of his position. The Upamāna, i. e. Comparison has been recognized as an independent species of valid cognition by the Mimämsakas. But the Jaina logician opines that the apprehension of similarity between the distant cow and the wild yak present before the perceiver is secured Jain Education International For Private & Personal Use Only www.jainelibrary.orgPage Navigation
1 ... 43 44 45 46 47 48 49 50 51 52 53 54 55 56 57 58 59 60 61 62 63 64 65 66 67 68 69 70 71 72 73 74 75 76 77 78 79 80 81 82 83 84 85 86 87 88 89 90 91 92 93 94 95 96 97 98 99 100 101 102 103 104 105 106 107 108 109 110 111 112 113 114 115 116 117 118 119 120 121 122 123 124 125 126 127 128 129 130 131 132 133 134 135 136 137 138 139 140 141 142 143 144 145 146 147 148 149 150 151 152 153 154 155 156 157 158 159 160 161 162 163 164 165 166 167 168 169 170 171 172 173 174 175 176 177 178 179 180 181 182 183 184 185 186 187 188 189 190 191 192 193 194 195 196 197 198 199 200 201 202 203 204 205 206 207 208 209 210 211 212 213 214 215 216 217 218 219 220 221 222 223 224 225 226 227 228 229 230 231 232 233 234 235 236 237 238 239 240 241 242 243 244 245 246 247 248 249 250 251 252 253 254 255 256 257 258 259 260 261 262 263 264 265 266 267 268 269 270 271 272 273 274 275 276 277 278 279 280 281 282 283 284 285 286 287 288 289 290 291 292 293 294 295 296 297 298 299 300 301 302 303 304 305 306 307 308 309 310 311 312 313 314 315 316 317 318 319 320 321 322 323 324 325 326 327 328 329 330 331 332 333 334 335 336 337 338 339 340 341 342 343 344 345 346 347 348 349 350 351 352 353 354 355 356 357 358 359 360 361 362 363 364 365 366 367 368 369 370 371 372 373 374 375 376 377 378 379 380 381 382 383 384 385 386 387 388 389 390 391 392 393 394 395 396 397 398 399 400 401 402 403 404 405 406 407 408 409 410 411 412 413 414