Vaishali Institute Research Bulletin 1

Author(s): Nathmal Tatia
Publisher: Research Institute of Prakrit Jainology & Ahimsa Mujjaffarpur

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VAISHALI INSTITUTE RESEARCH BULLETION NO. I
that perception is not competent for negation. Besides perception depends on the operation of senses and sense cannot operate on negation for want of a plausible relation. The knowledge of negation arises when one sees a particular object and remembers its opposite (pratiyogin) independently of the sense-object-contact. So knowledge of negation is non-perceptual and as it cannot be reduced to inference or verbal testimony, it must be recognised as a different species of cognition. The Naiyāyika contends that negation of a perceptible
ect is realised by sense-perception directly and abruptly. As for the contention of Kumarila that there is no relation between negation and sense, and between negation and the locus, the Naiyāyika pleads that the relation is sui generis. It is a substantive-a djective relation. The Jaina logician on the other hand maintains that when the sense is in touch with the empty locus, it cognizes negation which is a component factor of the positive locus. The debate between Kumārila and other logicians on this point is too elaborate to be succinctly treated. Each party will stick to his position and not be willing to capitulate. The number of types of valid cognition is a popular subject matter among the philosophers. There is however a general consensus regarding perception, inference and verbal testimony. But the Buddhist refuses to believe in the intrisic validity of verbal testimony on the ground that a word does not stand in objective relation to its meaning. The relation is rather imposed by convention and as such is not objective. The Jaina along with other respectable philosophers believes that relation between word and meaning is not entirely conventional or entirely natural, but one that partakes of both. No do ubt the speaker or the auditor can understand the meaning of word only if he had the knowledge of the convention. But convention is not entirely arbitrary or accidental. The word must not be repugnant to the meaning signified by it. This stand disposes of the objection of Dharmakīrti that there is no compelling relation like causality or identity of essence. A third necessary relation is not conceivable. The relation of denoter and denoted (vācyavā cakabhāva) is only conventional and ultimately depends upon the option of the original speaker. Here the Jaina joins issue with Dharmakit ti and offers certain convincing observations in support of his position.
The Upamāna, i. e. Comparison has been recognized as an independent species of valid cognition by the Mimämsakas. But the Jaina logician opines that the apprehension of similarity between the distant cow and the wild yak present before the perceiver is secured