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XI] Thought and its Object in Buddhism and Vedānta 31 specific relation with the blue that the blue alone should appear in consciousness at that moment. If it is urged that the blue produces the awareness of the blue, then what would be the function of the visual organ? It is better, therefore, the Buddhist suggests, to admit a natural and unique relation of identity of the idea and the object". The Vedāntist objects to this and says that such a supposition cannot be true, since we perceive that the subject, object and the idea are not one and the same. To such an objection the Buddhist is supposed to reply that these three do not form a complex unity, but arise at three successive moments of time, and then by virtue of their potency or root-impression a complex of the three appears; and this complex should not therefore be interpreted as being due to a relationing of three distinct entities?. Thus the fact that “I perceive blue” is not to be interpreted as a conscious relationing of “I," "the blue" and the awareness, but as an ideation arising at one particular point of time, involving all the three constituents in it. Such a supposition is necessary, because all appearances are momentary, and because the relationing of the three as three independent entities would necessarily be impossible without the lapse of some time for their operation of relationing. The theory of momentariness naturally leads us to the above supposition, that what appears as relationing is nothing but one momentary flash, which has the above three as its constituent elements; so the Buddhist is supposed to admit that, psychologic
1 tasmāt svābhāvikāsādharaņābhedasambandhād eva vijñāne nilam avabhāsate, Panca-pădikā-vivarana, p. 74.
Arguing from a similar point of view, Sāntaraksita and Kamalasila urge that, if the object was not identical with the awareness, there must be some immutable law why they should appear simultaneously. This law according to the Buddhists could only be either ofidentity (tādātmya) or of causality as invariability of production (tad-utpatti). The first alternative is what the Buddhists here are contending for as against the Vedāntists. There cannot be the law of causality here; for there cannot be any operation of the law of causality as production between two entities which are simultaneous. Tattt'a-samgraha and Pañjikā, 2030, 2031.
2 tad vāsanā-sameta-samanantora-pratyaya-samuttham sankalanātmakam pratyayāntaram etan neha sambandhāgamaḥ. Padmapäda's (A.D. 820) Pañca-pădikā, p. 25. This work exerted the greatest influence on the development of Vedāntic thought for about six or seven centuries, and several commentaries were written on it. Most important of these are Prakāśatman's Pañcapādikā-vivarana, Panca-padikādhyāsa-bhāşya-vyakhyā, Pañca-pădika-śāstra-darpana by Amộtānanda, Tattva-dipana by Amrtānandanātha, and also a commentary by Anandapūrņa Yati. Prakāśātman's commentary on it, called Pañcapădikā-vivarana, was commented upon by Akhandānanda Muni in his Tattva-dipana, by Rāmānanda Sarasvati in his Vivaraṇopanyāsa, and by Nộsimhāśrama in his Pañca-pădikāvivarana-bhāva-prakāśikā.
