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366 Philosophy of the Rāmānuja School of Thought (ch. effects and yet they have not the same existence as their causes. It cannot therefore be argued that if Brahman be regarded as the pariņāmi-kārana of the world, the world would thereby be as real as Brahman. Again, the non-appearance of the Brahma-character of the world may well be explained as being due to the influence of karma. Even for explaining the non-appearance of the Brahmacharacter of the world the assumption of an ajñāna is not necessary. It is also not necessary to define emancipation as the cessation of ajñāna, for that stage, being itself a state of bliss, can thereby be regarded as an object of our efforts, and the supposition of avidyā and its cessation is wholly groundless.
Mahācārya also made a vigorous effort to show by textual contents that the existence of avidyā as a positive ignorance is not admitted in the Vedic scriptures.
In the second chapter Mahācārya attempts to show that there is no necessity to admit an ajñāna as an independent hiding stuff. The Sankarites argue that though the self is experienced in the notion of our ego, yet the self is not expressed in our ego-experience as identical with Brahman as the fullness of bliss, and for this it is necessary to admit that there is an ajñāna stuff which hides the pure character of Brahman. To this Vahācārya's reply is that since ajñāna is regarded as beginningless its hiding capacity will also be eternal and no emancipation is possible; and if Brahman could be hidden, it will cease to have its own nature as self-luminous and will be ignorant. Moreover, the experience is of the form “I am ignorant" and as such the ajñāna seems to have reference only to the ego. If it is held that the existence of the veil is admitted only to explain the limited appearance of Brahman through mind (antahkarana), then it may well be pointed out that the limited appearance of Brahman as ego may well be explained through the limitation of the antahkarana through which it manifests itself, and for that it is not necessary to admit a separate veil of ajñāna.
Again it may be asked whether the veiling is identical with ajñāna or different from it. In the former case it would ever remain
vad uktam brahmanah pariņāmitaya upādānutve pariņāmasya puriņāmisamāna-suttukattu-niyumena karyasya'pi satyatta-prasariga iti. tatra kim pariņāma-sabdena karya-mātram litakṣitam, uta rūpă-ntarā-pattih; dhvamsasya avidyā-nityttesca pariņāmi-samāna-sattākatrā-bhūtāt na hi tad-rūpena pariņāmi kiñcid asti. na dvitiyum rupa-ntarā-patteh pariņāmi-mātra-sāpekșattāt gauravena st'a-samānu-sattāka-pariņāmz-apekşā-bhāvāt. Sad-vidyā-vijaya, p. 77.
