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The Philosophy of Vallabha
(CH. the other hand regarded as associated with them, so also the prakyti may be regarded as the identity of the gunas and also as their possessor. This is the distinction of Vallabha's conception of prakrti from the Samkhya view of it. The other categories of mahat, etc., are also supposed to evolve from the prakyti more or less in the Samkhya fashion: manas, however, is not regarded as an indriya.
The Pramānas. Purusottama says that knowledge (jñāna) is of many kinds. Of these, eternal knowledge (nitya-jñāna) is of four kinds: the essential nature of God, in which He is one with all beings and the very essence of emancipation (mokșa); the manifestation of His great and noble qualities; His manifestation as the Vedas in the beginning of the creation; His manifestation as verbal knowledge in all knowable forms of the deity. His form as verbal knowledge manifests itself in the individuals; it is for this reason that there can be no knowledge without the association of words—even in the case of the dumb, who have no speech, there are gestures which take the place of language. This is the fifth kind of knowledge. Then there are one kind of sense-knowledge and four kinds of mental knowledge. Of mental knowledge, that which is produced by manas is called doubt (samsaya); the function of manas is synthesis (samkalpa) and analysis (vikalpa). The function of buddhi is to produce knowledge as decision, superseding doubt, which is of an oscillatory nature. The knowledge of dreams is from ahamkāra (egoism) as associated with knowledge. Citta perceives the self in the state of deep dreamless sleep. There is thus the fourfold knowledge of the antaḥkarana; this and sense-knowledge and the previous five kinds of knowledge form the ten kinds of knowledge. From another point of view will (kāma), conceiving (samkalpa), doubt (vicikitsā), faith (śraddhā), absence of faith (aśraddhā), patience (dhrti), absence of patience (adhrti), shame (hrī), understanding (dhi), fear (bhi), are all manas. Pleasure and pain also belong to it, because they are not associated with the senses. Knowledge does not stay only for three moments, but stays on until it is superseded by other objects of knowledge, and even then it remains as impression or samskāra. This is proved by the fact that manas can discover it in memory when it directs its attention towards it; it is because the manas is
