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442 Jiva Gosvāmi and Baladeva Vidyābhūṣaṇa [ch. nature of God's powers and the supra-logical nature of the difference and identity of power and the possessor of power, or of the quality and the substance. Baladeva, by introducing the concept of višesa, tried to explain more clearly the exact nature of supra-logicality (acintyatva) in this case; this has been definitely pointed out in the Sūkṣma commentary'.
The bliss of God is different from the bliss of the jīvas, both in nature and in quantity, and the nature of their knowledge is different. Brahman is thus different in nature both from the world and from the jīvas. All the unity texts of the Upanişads are to be explained merely as affirming that the world and the jīvas belong to God (sarvatra tadiyatva-jñānārthaḥ). Such a way of looking at the world will rouse the spirit of bhakti. The revelation of God's nature in those who follow the path of vaidhi-bhakti is different from that in those who follow the ruci-bhakti; in the former case He appears in all His majesty, in the latter He appears with all His sweetness. When God is worshipped in a limited form as Krsna. He reveals Himself in His limited form to the devotee, and such is the supra-logical nature of God that even in this form He remains as the All-pervasive. It is evident that the acceptance of visesa does not help Baladeva here and he has to accept the supra-logical nature of God to explain other parts of his religious dogmas.
God is regarded as being both the material cause of the world and as the supreme agent. He has three fundamental powers: the supreme power, vişnu-sakti, the power as kşetrajña, the power as avidyā. In His first power Brahman remains in Himself as the unchangeable; His other two powers are transformed into the jīvas and the world. The Sāmkhyist argues that, as the world is of a different nature from Brahman, Brahman cannot be regarded as its material cause. Even if it is urged that there are two subtle powers which may be regarded as the material cause of the world and the jīvas, their objection still holds good; for the development of the gross, which is different from the subtle, is not explained. To this the reply is that the effect need not necessarily be the same as or similar to the material cause. Brahman transforms Himself into the world, which is entirely different from Him. If there were absolute oneness between the material cause and the effect, then
1 tenaiva tasya vastvabhinnatvam sva-nirvāhakatvam ca svasya tādrse tadbhāvojjrmbhakam acintyatuam sidhyati. Suksma on Govinda-bhāsya, 11. 2. 31.
