Book Title: History of Indian Philosophy
Author(s): Surendranath Dasgupta
Publisher: Cambridge University Press

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Page 2348
________________ 36 Literature of Southern Saivism [CH. the two moments are separate entities, then one cannot be the cause of the other. The causal change can only be with reference to the existing things, but not with regard to the entities which are momentary. In order that there may be a production, the thing must remain for two moments at least. Things that are existent need not always be productive. The production of an effect may depend on accessory causes. A jug cannot be produced by threads, but the threads may produce a piece of cloth. This shows that the effect is always already in the cause. It cannot also be held that our mental states are identical with the external objects, for in that case it would be difficult to explain the multiplicity of our cognitive states in accordance with their objects. We would not be able to explain how one entity assumes so many diverse forms. The only course left is to admit some external objects with which our senses come into contact. These objects consist of a conglomeration of tanmātras. It is in and through this conglomeration of tanmātras that new qualities arise to which we give the names of different bhūtas. The difference between tanmātras and bhūtas is that the former are more subtle and the latter more gross. This view is somewhat different from the Sāmkhya view, for here the bhūtas are not regarded as different categories, but only as a conglomeration of tanmātras. The idea that the gunas are certain objective entities is again and again repudiated. It is held that it is the conglomeration of guņas that is regarded by us as substantive entity. The Agama then criticises the theory of atoms which are partless. It is held that the partless atoms cannot have sides in which other atoms could be associated. The question is raised that tanmātras being formless (amūrta) cannot themselves be the causes of all forms. The world of forms thus leads us to infer some material as its cause. To this Siva replies that the prakrti can be regarded as being endowed with form and also as formless. Siva in further replying to the questions says that things having form must have other entities endowed with forms as their causes. Therefore one may infer that the atoms are the causes of the world. In that case one cannot deny the fact that the atoms have forms. In further discussing the subject Siva says that the atoms are many māyā tu paramā mūrta nityānityasya kāranam, ekāneka-vibhāgādhyā vastu-rūpā śivātmikā. Sixth patala.

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