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XXXI] The Philosophy of Baladeva Vidyābhūsaņa 441 not through sādhana-bhakti. The consciousness and bliss of God may be regarded either as the substance of God or as His attributes. This twofold way of reference to God is due to the admission of the category of risesa, by which, even in the absence of difference betiveen the substance and the quality, it is possible to predicate the latter of the former as if such a difference existed. Višeșa is spoken of as the representative of difference (bheda-pratinidhi); that is, where no difference exists, the concept of viseșa enables us to predicate a difference; yet this višeșa is no mere vikalpa or mere false verbal affirmation. The ocean can be spoken of as water and waves by means of this concept of višeșa. The concept of višeşa means that, though there is no difference between God and His qualities, or between His nature and His body, yet there is some specific peculiarity which makes it possible to affirm the latter of the former; and by virtue of this peculiarity the differential predication may be regarded as true, though there may actually be no difference between the two. It is by virtue of this concept that such propositions as "Being exists." "Time always is," "Space is everywhere," may be regarded as true; they are neither false nor mere verbal assumption; if they were false, there would be no justification for such mental states. There is obviously a difference between the two propositions "Being exists” and “Being does not exist”; the former is regarded as legitimate, the latter as false. This proves that though there is no difference between "being" and "existence" there is such a peculiarity in it that, while the predication of existence to being is legitimate, its denial is false. If it were merely a case of verbal assumption, then the latter denial would also have been equally possible and justifiable. This peculiarity is identical with the object and does not exist in it in any particular relation. For this reason a further chain of relations is not required, and the charge of a vicious infinite also becomes inadmissible. If the concept of višeşa is not admitted, then the notion of “qualified" and "quality" is inexplicable?. The concept of višesa in this sense was first introduced by Madhva; Baladeva borrowed the idea from him in interpreting the relation of God to His powers and qualities. This interpretation is entirely different from the view of Jiva and others who preceded Baladeva; we have already seen how Jiva interpreted the situation merely by the doctrine of the supra-logical
1 Ibid. II. 2. 31.
