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364 The Philosophy of Vallabha
(ch. with qualities when He is conditioned by avidyā. To this Vitthala says that, if Brahman is regarded as the Lord of the world, He cannot be affirmed as qualityless. It cannot be argued that these qualities are affirmed of Brahman as conditioned by avidyā; for, since both Brahman and avidyā are beginningless, there would be a continuity of creation; the creation, being once started by avidyā, would have nothing else to stop it. In the Vedāntic text it is the Brahman associated with will that is regarded as the cause of the world; other qualities of Brahman may be regarded as proceeding from His will. In the Sankarite view, according to which the will proceeds from the conditioned Brahman, it is not possible to state any reason for the different kinds of the will. If it is said that the appearance of the different kinds of will and qualities is the very nature of the qualities of the conditioned, then there is no need to admit a separate Brahman. It is therefore wrong to suppose that Brahman exists separately from the gunas of which He is the seat through the conditions. In the Brahma-sūtra also, immediately after launching into an enquiry about Brahman, Bādarāyaṇa defines His nature as that from which the creation and destruction of the world has proceeded; the Brahma-sūtra, however, states that such creative functions refer only to a conditioned Brahman. It is wrong to say that, because it is difficult to explain the nature of pure Brahman, the Brahma-sūtra first speaks of the creation of the world and then denies it; for the world as such is perceived by all, and there is no meaning in speaking of its creation and then denying it—it is as if one said “My mother is barren". If the world did not exist, it would not have appeared as such. It cannot be due to vāsanā; for, if the world never existed, there would be no experience of it and no vāsanā. Vāsanā also requires other instruments to rouse it, and there is no such instrument here.
It cannot be said that the avidyā belongs to the jīvas, because the jīvas are said to be identical with Brahman and the observed difference to be due to false knowledge. If knowledge destroys avidyā, then the avidyā of the jīva ought to be destroyed by the avidyā underlying it. Again, if the world is non-existent, then its cause, the avidyā, ought also to be non-existent. What is jīva? It cannot be regarded as a reflection of Brahman; for only that which has colour can have reflection; it is not the formless sky that is reflected in the sky, but the rays of the sun hovering above.
