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XXX] Ajñāna and Ego-hood (ahamkāra) 297 during dreamless sleep the self is perceived as supporting ignorance (as is testified by the experience “I did not know anything in deep sleep"), and hence it is different from the ego. The memory refers to pure consciousness as supporting ajñāna, and not to the ego. It is true that the Vivarana holds that recognition (pratyabhijñā) can be possible only of pure consciousness as associated with the antaḥkaraña; but, though this is so, it does not follow that the apprehension (abhijñā) of the pure consciousness should also be associated with the antaḥkarana. In the dreamless state, therefore, we have no recognition of pure consciousness, but an intuition of it. In the waking stage we have recognition not of the pure consciousness, but of the consciousness as associated with ajñāna. The emphasis of the statement of the Vivarana is not on the fact that for recognition it is indispensable that the pure consciousness should be associated with the antaḥkarana, but on the fact that it should not be absolutely devoid of the association of any conditioning factor; and such a factor is found in its association with ajñāna, whereby recognition is possible. The memory of the ego as the experiencer during dreams takes place through the intuition of the self during dreamless sleep and the imposition of the identity of the ego therewith. It is the memory of such an illusory imposition that is responsible for the apparent experience of the ego during dreamless sleep. It is wrong to suggest that there is a vicious circle; for it is only when the ego-substratum is known to be different from the self that there can be illusory identity and it is only when there is illusory identity that, as the ego does not appear during dreamless state, the belief that it is different is enforced. For it is only when the self is known to be different from the ego that there can be a negation of the possibility of the memory of the self as the ego. Vyāsa-tirtha says that, the ego-substratum (aham-artha) and the ego-sense (aham-kāra) being two different entities, the manifestation of the former does not involve as a necessary consequence the manifestation of the latter, and this explains how in the dreamless state, though the ego-substratum is manifested, yet the ego-sense is absent. To this Madhusūdana's reply is that the ego-substratum and the ego-sense are co-existent and thus, wherever the ego-substratum is present, there ought also to be the ego-sense, and, if during the dreamless state the egosubstratum was manifested, then the ego-sense should also have
