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298 Controversy between Dualists and Monists (ch. been manifested with it. He adds that the same objection cannot be made in regard to the manifestation of the self during the dreamless state; for the self is not associated with the ego-sense. Vyāsa-tirtha has said that, just as the Sankarites explain the manifestation of ajñāna in the dreamless state as having reference to objective entities only, and not to the pure sāksi-consciousness (as it could not without contradiction be manifested and be at the same time the object of ajñāna), so the manifestation of the ego-substratum is not contradicted by the association with ajñāna, but may be regarded as having reference to extraneous objective entities. To this Madusūdana's reply is that there is no contradiction in the appearance of ajñāna in the sākṣi-consciousness, as it may be in the case of its association with the ego-substratum, and so the explanation of Vyāsa-tirtha is quite uncalled-for.
Madhusūdana says that the ego-substratum may be inferred to be something different from the self, because, like the body, it is contemplated by our ego-perception or our perception as “I." If it is held that even the self is contemplated by the ego-perception, the reply is that the self, in the sense in which it is contemplated by the ego-perception, is really a non-self. In its essential nature the self underlying the ego-perception cannot be contemplated by the ego-perception. Again, the view of Vyāsa-tīrtha, that the fact of our feeling ourselves to be the supreme end of happiness shows that supreme happiness belongs to the ego-substratum, is criticized by the Sankarites to the effect that the supreme happiness, really belonging to the self, is illusorily through a mistaken identity imposed upon the ego-substratum. This criticism, again, is criticized by the Madhvas on the ground that such an explanation involves a vicious circle, because only when the supremely happy nature of the ego-substratum is known does the illusory notion of identity present itself; and that only when the illusory notion of identity is present is there awareness of that supremely happy nature. To this, again, the reply of Madhusūdana is that the experiencing of the dreamless stage manifests the self as pure consciousness, while the ego-substratum is unmanifest; thus through the testimony of deep sleep the ego-substratum is known to be different from the self. The ego-substratum is by itself unmanifested, and its manifestation is always through the illusory imposition of identity with the pure self. What Madhusūdana wishes to
