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296 Controversy between Dualists and Monists (CH. pure consciousness and not to the phenomenal self. Similar criticisms may also be made in the case of the explanation of such experience as “I shall attain the ultimate bliss," as based on the imposition of the ego upon the pure self?. Moreover, if the notion of the ego has as a constituent the mind, then such experience as "my mind," where the mind and the ego appear as different, would be impossible, and the experience of mind and ego would be the same. Moreover, all illusions have two constituents—the basis and the appearance; but in the ego no such two parts are experienced. It is also wrong to suppose that in such experiences as “I appear to myself” (aham sphurāmi) the appearance in consciousness is the basis and “appear to myself" is the illusory appearance2. For, the appearance (sphurana) of the ego being different from the egosubstance (aham-artha), there is no appearance of identity between them such that the former may be regarded as the basis of the latter. The ego is, thus, directly perceived by intuitive experieace as the self, and inference also points to the same; for, if the ego is enjoined to go through the ethical and other purificatory duties, and if it is the same that is spoken of as being liberated, it stands to reason that it is the ego substance that is the self. Vyāsa-tirtha further adduces a number of scriptural texts in confirmation of this view.
To this Madhusüdana's reply is that, if the ego-substance had been present in sleep, then its qualities, such as desire, wish, etc., would have been perceived. A substance which has qualities can be known only through such qualities: otherwise a jug with qualities would not require to be known through the latter. It is true, no doubt, that we affirm the existence of the jug in the interval between the destruction of its qualities of one order and the production of qualities of another order. But this does not go against the main thesis; for though a qualified thing requires to be known through its qualities, it does not follow that a qualityless thing should not be knowable. So it must be admitted that, since no qualities are apprehended during deep sleep, it is the qualityless self that is known in deep sleep; if it had not been perceived, there would have been no memory of it in the waking state. Moreover,
1 Vyāyāmrta, p. 283(a).
2 iha tu sphuranamātram adhisthānamiti sphurāmīty eva dhir iti cen na. Ibid. p. 38(a).
