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The Philosophy of Vallabha
CH. kārana is further enhanced by the supposition that, if He were so He must be liable to change (samavāyitve vikytatvasyāpatte”). Vallabha holds that the sūtra “tat tu samanvayāt" establishes the view that Brahman is the inherent cause (samavāyikārana), because it exists everywhere in His tripartite nature, as being, thought and bliss. The world as such (the prapañca) consists of names, forms and actions, and Brahman is the cause of them all, as He exists everywhere in His tripartite forms. The Sāmkhyists hold that it is the sattva, rajas and tamas which pervade all things, and all things manifest these qualities; a cause must be of the nature of the effects, since all effects are of the nature of sattva, rajas and tamas. So the reply is that there is a more serious objection, because the prakyti (consisting of sattva, rajas and tamas) is itself a part of Brahman (prakster api svamate tadamśatvāt)?. But yet the Sāmkhya method of approach cannot be accepted. The pleasure of prakyti is of the nature of ignorance, and is limited by time and space; things are pleasant to some and unpleasant to others; they are pleasant at one time and not pleasant at another; they are pleasant in some places and unpleasant in other places. But the bliss of Brahman is unlimited by conditions; the relation of, bliss and the self as associated with knowledge is thus different from the pleasure of prakrti (ātmānandajñānena prākṣtikapriyatvādau bādhadarśanāt). The Brahman therefore pervades the world in His own true nature as knowledge and bliss. It is by His will that He manifests Himself as many and also manifests His three characters—thought, being and bliss-in different proportions in the material world of antaryāmins. This pervasion of Brahman as many and all is to be distinguished from the Sankarite exposition of it. According to Sankara and his followers the phenomenal world of objects has the Brahman as its basis of reality; the concrete appearances are only impositions on this unchanging reality. According to this view the concrete appearances cannot be regarded as the effects of Brahman, or, in other words, Brahman cannot be regarded as the upādāna or the material cause of the stuff of the concrete objects. We know that among the Sankarites also there are diverse opinions regarding the material cause of the world. Thus the author of the Padārtha-nirņaya thinks that Brahman and māyā are jointly the
1 Vallabha's Anubhāsya, p. 85. 2 Puruşottama's commentary, p. 86.