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XXX] The theory of Avidyā refuted
291 knowledge specifically, but with reference to knowledge in general. Moreover, if caitanya (pure consciousness) and ajñāna were not opposed to each other, it would be wrong to designate the one as the negation of the other, i.e., as knowledge (jñāna) and ignorance (ajñāna). Moreover, if cognitions are only possible and ignorances can only be removed through the manifestation of the self-shining pure consciousness, it stands to reason that it is the pure consciousness that should be opposed to ajñāna. It is also unreasonable to suppose that the self could have ajñāna associated with it and yet be self-luminous. There ought to be no specific point of difference between the ortti and the sāksi-consciousness in their relation to ajñāna; for they may both be regarded as opposed to ajñāna. If the sākṣi-consciousness were not opposed to ajñāna, then it could not remove ignorance regarding pleasure, pain, etc. There is no reason to suppose that no ajñāna can be associated with whatever is manifested by sākṣi-consciousness. It is indeed true that there is no ajñāna in the knower, and the knower does not stand in need of the removal of any ignorance regarding itself. The self is like a lamp ever self-luminous; no darkness can be associated with it. It is for this reason that, though ordinary objects stand in need of light for their illumination, the self, the knower, does not stand in need of any illumination. It is also wrong to suppose that the pure consciousness is opposed to ajñāna only when it is reflected through a vrtti state, and that in the case of the experience of pleasure the sākşi-consciousness is reflected through a ortti of the pleasureform; for, if this is admitted, then it must also be admitted that the pleasure had a material existence before it was felt, and thus, as in the case of other objects, there may be doubts about pleasure and pain also; and so the accepted view that the perception of pleasure is also its existence must be sacrificed. Thus it has to be admitted that pure consciousness is opposed to ignorance regarding pleasure, pain, etc. There is, therefore, as regards opposition to knowledge no difference between pure consciousness and pure consciousness manifested through a vrtti. Nor can it be said that pleasure, pain, etc., are perceived by the pure consciousness as reflected through the vrtti of the antaḥkaraña; for the vrtti of the antaḥkarana can arise only through sense-functioning, and in the intuition of internal pleasure there cannot be any such sense-function. Nor can it be a reflection through the ortti of avidyā; for that is possible
