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292 Controversy between Dualists and Monists [CH. only in the presence of a defect or defects. If, like things immersed in darkness, like absence of knowledge, ajñüna be utter unmanifestation, then it cannot be manifested by the sākṣi-consciousness. Again, if it is held that vịtti is opposed to ajñāna, then, since there exists the ego-vrtti forming the jīva and the object-formed vrtti representing the knowledge of the material objects, it might well be expected that these vrttis would oppose the existence of ajñāna and that there would be immediate emancipation.
To this Madhusūdana’s reply is that the ajñāna is called a veil in the sense that it has a fitness (yogyatā) by virtue of which it is capable of making things appear as non-existent or unmanifested, though it may not always exert its capacity, with the result that in dreamless sleep the operation of the veil exists, while in emancipation it is suspended. Generally speaking, the veil continues until the attainment of Brahma-knowledge. It may be objected that the concept of a veil, being different from that of pure consciousness, is itself a product of false imagination (kalpita), and therefore involves a vicious circle; to this the reply would be that avidyā is beginningless, and hence, even if a false imagination at any particular stage be the result of a preceding stage and that of a still further preceding stage, there cannot be any difficulty. Moreover, the manifestation of the āvarana does not depend on the completion of the infinite series, but is directly produced by pure consciousness. It must be remembered that, though the pure consciousness in its fulness is without any veil (as during emancipation), yet on other occasions it may through the operation of the veil have a limited manifestation. Against the objection of Vyāsa-tîrtha that pure consciousness, being homogeneous, is incapable of having any association with a veil, Madhusūdana ends by reiterating the assertion that veiling is possible—for which, however, no new reason is given. To the objection that the veil, like the jug, cannot avert the illumination of the lamp inside, and can obstruct only with reference to the things outside the jug, but that in the case of the obstruction of pure consciousness no such external entity is perceivable, Madhusūdana's reply is that the obstruction of the pure consciousness is with reference to the jīca. The veiling and the jīva being both related to each other in a beginningless series, the question regarding their priority is illegitimate. Madhusūdana points out that, just as in the experience "I do not know what you say” the
