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262 Controversy between Dualists and Monists [CH. silver nor its knowledge appears as ajñāna. Thus the two definitions of ajñāna fail.
In reply to this Madhusūdana says that the ajñāna which forms the stuff of the illusory silver is the beginningless ajñāna. The ajñāna is called positive in the sense that it is different from the negative. It is for this reason that the ajñāna which is regarded as the material stuff of the illusory negation can be regarded as different from negation, and therefore it can be regarded as constituent of the illusory negation. It is by no means true that the effect must be of exactly the same stuff as the cause. Things which are absolutely similar in nature or absolutely dissimilar cannot be related to each other as cause and effect; it is for this reason that truth cannot be the material stuff of untruth. For in that case, since truth never ceases to manifest itself, and never suffers change, untruth also would never cease to manifest itself. The truth, however, can behave as the cause of untruth in the sense that it remains as the basis of the illusory changes of the untruth. It is wrong also to suppose that, since the ajñāna of Brahman cannot be removed through a vịtti, which itself is a manifestation of ajñāna, Brahmaknowledge itself becomes impossible; for, so far as Brahman is a content, this ajñāna (as content) can be removed by a uștti. In the case of jīvan-mukti, though the ultimate cessation may be delayed through absence of the obstructive factors of the right karmas of the past and other conditions, these may well be regarded as liable to cessation through knowledge. Certain causes may produce certain effects; but that such production may be delayed for some reason does not invalidate the causal character of the cause. It is well admitted by the Sankarites that knowledge directly removes ajñāna, the removal being itself a part of ajñāna.
It is wrong to suppose that whatever is imaginary must necessarily be an idea due to defects or must have a temporal beginning; but it must be a product which is simultaneous with the imagination that produces it?
It is also wrong to suppose that, if any entity is not positive, it must be negative or that, if it is not negative, it must be positive; for there is always scope for a third alternative, viz., that which is neither positive nor negative. According to the Sankarites the
i kalpitatva-matram hi na dosa-janya-dhi-mătra-sariratve sāditve vā tantram. kimtu prātibhāsa-kalpaka-samānakālina-kalpakattvam. Advaita-siddhi, p. 544.
