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XXX The theory of Avidyā refuted
283 so much opposed, yet the latter may be supposed to be based on the former. To this the reply is that, following the analogy where a false darkness is ascribed to sunlight, one may be justified in thinking that a false ajñāna different from the ajñāna under discussion may be based on the pure consciousness. Moreover, the experience “I am ignorant" shows that the ignorance (avidyā) is associated with the ego and not with pure consciousness. It cannot be suggested that, both the ego and the ignorance being at the same time illusorily imposed on the pure consciousness, they appear as associated with each other, which explains the experience “I am ignorant"; for without first proving that the ajñāna exists in the pure consciousness the illusory experience cannot be explained, and without having the illusory experience first the association of ajñāna with pure consciousness cannot be established, and thus there would be a vicious circle. It is also wrong to suppose that the experience "I am ignorant" is illusory. Moreover, the very experience "I am ignorant" contradicts the theory that ajñāna is associated with pure consciousness, and there is no means by which this contradiction can be further contradicted and the theory that ajñāna rests on pure consciousness be supported. The notions of an agent, knower, or enjoyer are always associated with cognitive states and therefore belong to pure consciousness. If these notions were imposed upon the pure consciousness, the ajñāna would belong to it (which, being a false knower, is the same as the individual self or jīva), and, so would belong to jīva; this would be to surrender the old thesis that ajñāna belongs to pure consciousness. It is also not right to say that the ajñāna of the conch-shell belongs to the consciousness limited by it; it is always experienced that knowledge and ignorance both belong to the knower. If it is contended that what exists in the substratum may also show itself when that substratum is qualified in any particular manner, and that therefore the ajñāna in the pure consciousness may also show itself in the self or jiva, which is a qualified appearance of pure consciousness, to this the reply is that, if this contention is admitted, then even the pure consciousness may be supposed to undergo through its association with ajñāna the world-cycles of misery and rebirth.
The supposition that the jīva is a reflection and the impurities are associated with it as a reflected image and not with the Brahman, the reflector, is wrong; for, if the ajñāna is associated
