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XXX] Refutation of definition of Avidyā (nescience) 263 principle of the excluded middle is a false premiss of logic, and thus they admit the possibility of an extra-logical category, that which is neither positive nor negative. The supposed inference that beginningless positive entity must necessarily be permanent, like the self, is false; for it is only in the case of self that beginningless positive entity is found eternally to persist.
It is also wrong to suppose that, since ajñāna is always manifested through pure consciousness, it can never cease to exist; for there is no law that whatever is manifested by the sākṣi-consciousness must remain during the whole period while the sākși persists; so there is no incongruity in supposing that the ajñāna ceases, while the sākṣi-consciousness persists. Moreover, the avidyā that becomes manifested is so only through the sākṣi-consciousness as modified or limited by it; such a limited consciousness may cease to exist with the cessation of the avidyā. It is also wrong to suppose that through the operation of the ortti the avidyā ceases to exist; for even in such cases it persists in its subtle causal form.
When avidyā is defined as being constituted of the stuff of illusion (bhramopādāna), what is meant is that it is changing and material. It is not necessary to suppose also that a cause and effect must necessarily be positive; for the self, which is a positive entity, is neither a cause nor an effect. What constitutes the defining characteristic of a material cause is that it is continuous with all its effects (anvayi-kāranatvam upādānatve tantram); and what is an effect must necessarily have a beginning in time. A negationprecedent-to-production of knowledge cannot be regarded as the material cause of illusion; for such negation can only produce the correlative positive entity with which it is connected. It cannot therefore be the cause of production of illusion; so there is no incongruity in supposing that ajñāna or illusion, neither of which is real, are related to each other as cause and effect. It is also not correct to contend that a material cause should always be found to persist as a perceivable continuous constituent of all its effects; the colour of the material cause of a jug is not found in the jug. The fact that, when thu ajñāna is removed with the knowledge of the conch-shell, no illusion is experienced, is no proof that ajñāna is not a constituent of illusion. Not all things that are related as cause and effect are always experienced as such. Thus the definitions of ajñāna as anādi-bhāvarūpatve sati jñāna-nivartyatvam or as bhramopādānatvam are valid.
