________________
XXX Inference of ajñāna
277 minor term is further narrowed, so as to mean merely the direct cognition of the material object, then also, since the Sankarites do not admit that there are veils on the object, the object-cognition cannot be regarded as having removed such a veil. If in answer to this it is held that the mental state, e.g., the cognition of jug, involves a limitation of the pure consciousness by the jug-form and, since the ajñāna has the same scope as the above limitation, the removal of the veil on the jug-form limitation means also the removal of the veil of ajñāna to that extent, the reply is, first, that on the view that there is only one ajñāna the above explanation does not hold; secondly, since the pure consciousness, limited in any form, is not self-luminous, it cannot, according to the Sankarites, be associated with a veil, which can only be associated with the pure self-luminous consciousness. Moreover, if the removal of the veil is spoken of as having reference only to material objects, then, since the verbal proposition “this is a jug" has the same content as the jug itself, the removal of the veil with reference to the material object-the jug—which has the same content as the mediate verbal proposition, ought not to take place.
Again, since on the Sankarite view the vrtti-knowledge is itself false, there cannot be any possibility that illusory objects should be imposed upon it. On the other hand, if the pure consciousness, as manifested by the vrtti, be synonymous with knowledge, then, since such a consciousness is the support of ajñāna, it cannot be regarded as removing ajñāna. Thus the requirement of the inference that knowledge establishes itself by removing ajñāna fails; further, the requirement of the definition that the veil that is removed has the same location as the knowledge fails, since the ajñāna is located in pure consciousness, whereas the cognition is always of the conditioned consciousness.
The inference supposes that there is a removal of the veil because there is a manifestation of the unmanifested; but this cannot hold good, since the Brahma-knowledge cannot be manifested by any thing other than pure consciousness, and the self-luminous which is the basis of all illusions, is ever self-manifested, and thus there is no possibility here of the unmanifested being manifested. Moreover, if the ajñāna be a positive entity existing from beginningless time, then it would be impossible that it should be removed. It is also impossible that that which is a veil should be beginning
