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208 Controversy between Dualists and Monists [CH. believed to be a product of ajñāna does not in the least imply that its very nature cannot be false; for what is by its very nature false would be so, whether produced or not. The denial of the conchshell-silver (“this is not silver'') means that the conch-shell-silver is other than the real market-silver, i.e., the negation here is that of otherness (anyo-anya-abhāva). But, when it is said that “here is no silver," the negation is one of non-existence, and the falsity of the appearance is thereby definitely declared (sā ca purovarttirajatasyaiva vyāvahārikam atyanta-abhāvam vişayīkaroti iti kanthoktam eva mithyātvam), whereas in the former case falsehood is only implied (idam śābda-nirdiste purovarti-prātītika-rajate rajataśabda-nirdista-vyāvahārika-rajata-anyonya-abhāva-pratiter arthikam mithyātvam)'. Now, if the world-appearance be denied (“there is no world-appearance here"), then, since there is no world-appearance anywhere else, the denial implies the absolute non-existence of the world-appearance, i.e., world-appearance is as non-existent as any chimerical entity, e.g., the hare's horn. The reply to such an objection, that there is a difference between the absolute negation of the world-experience as indescribable (anirvācya) and the absolute negation as chimerical (tucca), is that the latter has not even a seeming appearance anywhere, whereas the former appears as really existent until it is contradicted (kvachid apy upādhau sattvena pratīty-anarhatvam atyantaasattvam yāvad bādham pratitiyogyatvam prātītika-sattvam). It must further be noted in this connection that the denial which leads to falsehood must have the same relation and the same extent and scope as the content which is being denied (yena rūpeṇa yadadhikaranatayā yat pratipannam tena rūpena tan-nista-atyantaabhāva-pratiyogitvasya pratipanna-padena sūcitatvāt; tac ca rūpam
ambandha-višeşo'vacchedakavišeșaś ca)? The Sankarites, moreover, do not admit negation as a separate category, but consider the negation to be identical with the unqualified nature of the locus where the negation appears. Brahman has no qualities, and this does not therefore mean that it has a negative quality; for, there being more separate negations, the negation of all qualities simply means the pure nature of Brahman. The attribution of so-called positive qualities also as infinitude, etc., means the negation of the opposite qualities of falsehood and limitation, which ultimately 1 Advaita-siddhi, pp. 130-1.
? Ibid. p. 151.
