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214 Controversy between Dualists and Monists [ch. absence of the substance only when such qualities are dependent on the nature of the substance; but falsehood is not so, since it is naturally opposed to that to which it refers?. Moreover, if the falsehood of the conch-shell-silver becomes false merely because it is associated with the illusory silver, though it is affirmed by an experience of contradiction, then it might equally well be real because of its ultimate association with Brahman, the ground reality of all things; or on the other hand the conch-shell might equally well be false because of its association with the illusory silver, and the non-existent would also be existent because of its association with existence, and vice versa. Moreover, the conchshell-silver is not regarded by the Sankarites as absolutely nonexistent, like the chimerical hare's horn, and therefore falsehood cannot be considered to be so on account of its association therewith. Again, the argument that falsehood has not the same status of existence as the world-appearance to which it refers and therefore the assertion of falsehood does not hurt extreme monism is wrong: for, if falsehood has only a relative existence (vyāvahāriktve), the world of our daily experience, which is opposed to it and which is attested by perception, ought to be regarded as ultimately real. Thus our former objection remains valid, that, if falsehood be uncontradicted, the doctrine of monism fails and, if contradicted, the world would be real.
Madhusūdana has the former reply to the above objection that, when the position and negation have a different order of being, the negation of the negation does not imply affirmation. If the negation refers to a relative existence, then such negation does not take away the assertion of a fanciful existence4. Thus an entity may be in different senses both true and false. Madhusūdana further says that, when the denial is due to a specific quality, then the negation of negation cannot be an affirmation. Here both the conch-shell and its quality are denied on account of their common
1 dharmy-asattve dharmāsattvam tu dharmi-sattvāsāpekșa-dharma-visayam; mithyātvam tu tat-pratikūlam. Nyāyāmrta, p. 44.
2 Ibid. p. 45. 3
mithyātvam yady abādhyam syāt syad advaita-mata-kșatih mithyātvam jadi bădhyam syāt jagat-satyatvam āpatet.
Ibid. p. 47. paraspara-viraha-rūpatve'pi vişama-satvākayor avirodhāt vyāvahārikamithyātvena vyāvahārika-satyatvāpahāre'pi kālpanika-satyatvānapahārāt.
Advaita-siddhi, p. 217.
