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254 Controversy between Dualists and Monists [CH. defects, then defects also are results of illusory impositions, and thus there will be a vicious infinite; for illusion through beginningless avidyā does not belong to defects, and, though illusions which have a temporal beginning are due to the beginningless avidyādefect, this does not render all cognitions invalid, since only illusions which have a temporal beginning are due to the defect of avidyā, and, since avidyā itself is beginningless, it cannot stand in need of any defects, and so there cannot be any vicious infinite. It must be borne in mind that, though illusion in time is due to defects, or dosa, the beginningless defect of avidyā, it is not necessarily due to any such defect, and therefore stands directly and spontaneously as an illusory creative agent; and is called illusion, not because it is produced by defects, but because it is contradicted by Brahma-knowledge. Thus the objection that avidyā is due to defect, and defect is due to avidyā, is invalid; that which is a product of defects is bound to be contradicted; but the converse of this is not necessarily true.
It cannot be urged that, if avidyā is independent of doșa, the world-illusion may be regarded as independent of the locus or basis of illusion, viz., the Brahman; for, though the basis of illusion may not be regarded as producing illusion, it has to be regarded as the support and ground thereof and also as its illuminator?
Again, the objection that illusion must depend on Sensefunctioning, on the existence of the body, is invalid; for these are necessary only for intuitive perception. But in the cases of illusion, of the imposition of the avidyā upon the pure consciousness, the latter is the spontaneous reflector of the avidyā creations, and so for the purpose there is no necessity of the sense-functioning.
Again, it is urged that, since the defects are imaginary impositions, the negation of defects becomes real, and therefore the defects, being unreal, cannot render the knowledge of worldappearance unreal; and, if this is so, the world-appearance being real, this would be our admission of reality (as an illustration of this, it is urged that the criticism of the Buddhists against the Vedas, being invalid and illusory, cannot stultify the validity of the Vedas). To this the reply is that the criticism of the defects pointed out against the Vedas by the Buddhists is illusory, because the defects are only imagined by them; the Vedas are not affected
1 Advaita-siddhi, p. 498
