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xxix] Nature of Knowledge
235 possible; for, if the consciousness reflected in the antaḥkaraña-vrtti be supposed to remove the veil of the object, it may as well be held to manifest it, and it is, therefore, unnecessary to suppose that the ground-consciousness illumines the object.
Further, it cannot be admitted that the vștti assumes the form of the gross physical objects; for then it would be as gross and material as the objects are. Moreover, the existence of an object assumes therewith the existence of the negation of other entities; and, if the antaḥkarana is supposed to take the forın of an object, it must also assume the negative forms; it is, however, difficult to conceive how the antaḥkarana can be supposed to assume the positive and the negative forms at one and the same time. Again, following the same supposition in the case of the final intuition, it has to be assumed that the antaḥkarana-vrtti assumes the form of Brahman; this, however, has no form, so that the antaḥkarana-vrtti must be supposed to be here both formless and endowed with form --which is absurd.
Moreover, it is not legitimate to suppose that it is the consciousness underlying the finite self (jīva-caitanya) that reveals the object; for, on the supposition that the objects are illusory superpositions on pure consciousness or on the consciousness underlying the objects, the Sankarite theory fails; for in this case the perceiving consciousness, being consciousness underlying the jīva, would be different either from pure consciousness or from the consciousness underlying the objects, which is supposed to be the basis of the illusory creations. The jīva itself, moreover, cannot be regarded as the basis of the creation; for it is itself an illusory creation. For the same reasons also it cannot be asserted that it is the Brahmaconsciousness that illumines the object. Thus the Brahman, being itself as underlying the objects, an illusory creation, cannot be regarded as also illuminating the objects. The pure consciousness underlying the objects, being itself veiled by ajñāna, should not also be able to manifest itself; and thus all knowledge of objects would be impossible. If it is argued that, though the pure consciousness is veiled, yet the consciousness limited by the objectform may be manifested by the vrtti of the antaḥkarana, that is not correct: for it cannot be admitted that the consciousness limited by the object-forms is itself the basis of those object-forms, since that would amount to an admission that the object-forms are their own
