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246 Controversy between Dualists and Monists [CH. fact of object-forms, then even previous to the existence of definite object-forms there cannot be any ajñāna, or, in other words, ajñāna cannot exist as a pre-condition, it being only coterminous with definite object-forms. To this Madhusūdana's reply is that the object-forms, being imposition upon pure consciousness and the latter being their ground, the manifestation of consciousness with reference to any object-form depends upon the removal of ajñāna with reference to the illusory creation of that object-form imposed upon the ground-consciousness. The ajñāna itself does not constitute the object-form; therefore the removal of ajñāna has reference not to object-forms as separate and independent entities, but only to the creation of such object-forms imposed upon the groundconsciousness. Thus there is no objection; the existence of ajñāna as a pre-condition is such that, when along with itself object-forms are created, the veil on these is removed by the vrtti contact leading to their cognition. The position is that, though the groundconsciousness reveals the object-forms imposed upon it, yet such a revelation takes place only with reference to that perceiver whose vrtti comes into contact with the object, and not with reference to others. The condition of the revelation is that the consciousness underlying the perceiver, the vrtti and the object-form becomes identical, as it were, through the imposition of the vrtti upon the object. This tripartite union being a condition of the manifestation of an object to a particular perceiver, the object, revealed by the ground-consciousness underlying it, is not manifested to other perceivers.
The World as Illusion. Vyāsa-tírtha tried to refute the Sankarite theory that the world is an illusory imposition. He contends that, if the world is an illusory creation, it must have a basis (adhisthāna) which in a general manner must be known, and must yet be unknown so far as its special features are concerned. Brahman, however, has no general characteristic, and, since it is devoid of any specific peculiarities, any affirmation that it stands as the entity of which the specific peculiarities are not known would be inadmissiblel. To this
adhisthānatva-sāmānyatve jñāte saty ajñāta-višeşavattvasya prayojakatvāt. brahmanaḥ samānya-dharmopetatvādinā tāvat jñātatvam na sambhavati. nissāmānyatvāt. ajñāta-višeşavattvam ca na sambhavati nirvišeşatvāngikarāt. Srinivasa's Nyāyāmrta-prakāśa, on the Nyāyāmrta, p. 234.
