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238 Controversy between Dualists and Monists [CH. object should be manifest to other individuals, so that, when a person sees an object, that object should be visible also to other persons at other places. Again, is the ajñāna to be accepted as one, according to the author of the Vivarana, or as many, according to the author of the Ista-siddhi? In the former case, when by one right knowledge ajñāna is removed, there ought to be immediate emancipation. If the ajñāna is not removed, then the silverappearance of conch-shell should not have been contradicted, and the form of conch-shell could not have been manifested. It cannot be said that in the case of the perception of conch-shell through negation of the silver-appearance the ajñāna is merely dissolved (just as a jug is reduced to dust by the stroke of a club, but not destroyed), which can only be done through Brahma-knowledge; for ajñāna is directly opposed to knowledge, and without destroying ignorance knowledge cannot show itself. If the ajñāna were not removed by the knowledge of the conch-shell, then the manifested consciousness would have no relation to the conch-shell, and it could not have been manifested, and in spite of the contradiction the illusion would have remained. Nor can it be suggested that, though ajñāna may be removed in some parts, it might continue in others; for ajñāna and consciousness are both partless. Nor can it be suggested that, just as by the influence of certain precious stones the burning capacity of fire can be stopped, so by the knowledge of the conch-shell the veiling power of avidyā is suspended; for the antaḥkarana-vrtti in the form of the conch-shell, being produced through the agency of the visual organ and other accessories, cannot be in touch with the pure self, which is devoid of all characteristics, and therefore it cannot remove the veiling power. If it is suggested that the vrtti of the form of the conchshell is in association with the pure consciousness, under the limited form of the conch-shell, and can therefore remove the veil, then the underlying pure consciousness ought to be directly intuited. Avidyā cannot have the material objects as its support; for they are themselves the product of avidyā. So the veiling power of avidyā also can have no reference to the material objects, since a veil can hide only what is luminous; the material objects, not being luminous, cannot be veiled. So there is no meaning in saying that the veil of the objects is removed in perception. If, again, it is said that the veil has reference to the pure self, as modified by the
