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XXIX] Nature of Knowledge
239 material characteristic, and not to the material characteristic, then with the knowledge of the conch-shell the veil of the conch-shell underlying it might be removed, and this ought to bring immediate emancipation. If it is suggested that the ajñāna which forms the substratum of the illusory silver is but a special modified state of a root ajñāna which forms the material of the conch-shell, then that virtually amounts to an assumption of many ajñānas independent of one another; and, that being so, it would not necessarily follow that the knowledge of the conch-shell could dispel the illusory appearance of silver.
On the view of the author of the Ista-siddhi, if the existence of many ajñānas is admitted, then the question is whether by the operation of one vrtti only one ajñāna is removed or all the ajñānas. In the former view the conch-shell could never remain unmanifested even in the case of illusion, since vrtti manifesting the illusory silver would also manifest silver; and on the second view, there being infinite ajñānas, which cannot all be removed, conchshell would never be manifested. This criticism would apply equally well to the former view that there is only one root ajñāna of which there are many states. Again, it is difficult to understand how the conch-shell, which has a beginning in time, can be associated with beginningless avidyā. Further, if it is urged in reply that the beginningless avidyā limits the beginningless pure consciousness and that later, when other objects are produced, the ajñāna appears as the veil of pure consciousness limited by those object-forms, the reply is that, if the veil associated with pure consciousness is the same as the veil associated with consciousness in limited objectforms, then, with the knowledge of any of those objects, the veil of pure consciousness would be removed, and immediate emancipation would result.
Rāmādvaya, the author of the Vedānta-kaumudi, suggests that, just as there is an infinite number of negations-precedent-toproduction (prāg-abhāra), and yet, when anything is produced, only one of them is destroyed, or just as, when there is a thunderbolt falling upon a crowd, only one of them may be killed, while others may only disperse, so with the rise of knowledge only one ajñāna may be removed, while others may persist. Vyāsa-tirtha replies that the analogy is false, since (according to him) negationprecedent-to-knowledge is not a veil but merely the absence of the
