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236 Controversy between Dualists and Monists [ch. basis, which would be a fallacy of self-dependence (ātmāšraya), and the original contention of the Sankarites that the objects are illusorily imposed upon pure consciousness fails. Moreover, if the process of knowledge is admitted to be such that the antahkaranavịtti manifests the pure consciousness as limited by objective forms, then the case of final intuition (Brahman-knowledge), where objective characteristics are absent, would be inexplicable. Again, the Sankarites hold that in deep dreamless sleep the antahkarana is dissolved; and, if that were so, the jīva, which is the consciousness limited by a particular antaḥkarana, would be renewed after each dreamless sleep, and thus the fruits of the karma of one jīva ought not to be reaped by the new jīva. The view that the pure consciousness is reflected through a vstti is also inadmissible; for reflections can happen only between two visible objects. The view that consciousness is transformed into a particular state is also inadmissible, since by hypothesis consciousness is unchangeable. Consciousness being entirely unsupported by anything else (anāšritatvāt), the analogy of the relation of universal and particular as explaining the conditioning of consciousness is also inadmissible. Moreover, if the consciousness underlying the jīva be regarded as manifesting the objects, then, since such a consciousness always exists in an unveiled form, there is no meaning in saying that in effecting its spontaneous manifestation the operation of the vștti is necessary. Also the pure consciousness cannot be regarded as being limited by the vrtti just as limitless space is supposed to be limited by a jug; for the pure consciousness is allpervading and, as such, it must also pervade the vrtti and cannot therefore be regarded as being inside it. Neither can the pure consciousness be compared with the ray of light manifesting colour; for the ray of light does so only with the help of accessories, whereas pure consciousness manifests things by itself. Again, if things are manifested spontaneously by the unveiled consciousness (anāvrtacit yadi visaya-prakāśikā), then, since such a consciousness is in touch with objects not only so far as their forms and colours are concerned, but also with their other characteristics such as weight, these also ought to be illuminated along with qualities such as colour, etc. Moreover, the relation of consciousness to the object cannot be of the nature of eternal contact, but must be of the nature of illusory imposition upon it (consciousness); this being so, the
