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XXIX] On the Falsity of the World temporal limitation cannot be associated with negation as "otherness"; for, if the limitation as otherness be denied at any time, then all things in the world would be one. Now limitation by other entities (which is the third definition of limitation) means “difference" (bhinnatva); but such a limitation (according to the Sankarites) is absent in the world of everyday experience; for they deny the reality of difference. Again, difference from falsehood exists also in the self: therefore the argument of Anandabodha, that whatever things exist divided (vibhaktatvāt) are on that account false, is invalid. It is, again, wrong to suppose that the unlimited nature of being consists in the fact that it alone remains universal, whereas everything else changes and must therefore be considered to be imposed upon it, since, when we say “a jug exists," "a jug moves," the jug seems to remain unchanged, while its verb changes, as "exists" and "moves." As “many" is associated with “one," so "one" also is associated with “many"; so nothing can be made of the argument that what remains constant is unlimited and valid and what is changeful is false.
To this Madhusudana's reply is that, since the Sankarites do not admit universals, it is wrong to suppose that in all cases of the existence of a cow there is something like the cow-universal which persists, and, if that is not so, then the only other explanation is that it is the individuals that come and go and are imposed upon the persistent experience of being, which alone is therefore real. Now, again, it may be argued, the Brahman, as being, is always covered by ajñāna; it has no distinguishable form, and so it is wrong to think that Brahman is manifested as being in our experience of the worldobjects. To this the reply is that Brahman is itself not covered by ajñāna (sad-ātmană na brahmano mülājñānenā-vrtatvam): it is only by the limitations of the specific forms of world-objects that its nature is hidden; when the obstacles of these specific forms are broken by the function of the vștti modification of the mind, the Brahman underlying these objects manifests itself as pure being. It cannot be objected that Brahman, as such a pure being, has no visual characteristics and therefore cannot be perceived by the eye; for Brahman is not perceivable by any of the senses or by any specific sensel.
1 na ca rūpādi-hinatayā cākşuşatvãdy-anupapattiḥ bādhika iti vācyam, pratiniyatendriya-grāhyesu eva rūpădy-apeksā-niyamāt sarvendriya-grāhyam tu sadrūpam brahma năto rūpādi-hinatve' pi cakşusatvady anupapattih sattuāyāḥ parair api sarvendriya-grāhyatva-ābhyupagamāt ca. Advaita-siddhi, p. 318.
