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The Nimbarka School of Philosophy
[CH.
identity is comprehended only as the negation of the two-term duality.
Thus, from the above considerations, the main thesis of the Sankarites, that all things are identical with Brahman, falls to the ground.
According to Nimbārka the ideal of emancipation is participation in God's nature (tad-bhāvā-patti). This is the ultimate end and summum bonum of life (prayojana). According to the Sankarites emancipation consists in the ultimate oneness or identity existing between individual souls and Brahman. The Brahman in reality is one with the individual souls, and the apparent difference noticed in our ordinary practical life is due to misconception and ignorance, which impose upon us a false notion of duality. Madhava Mukunda urges that in such a view, since the individual souls are already one with Brahman, they have nothing to strive for. There is thus really no actual end (proyojana) as the goal of our strivings. Mādhava Mukunda, in attempting to emphasize the futility of the Sankarite position, says that, if the ultimate consciousness be regarded as one, then it would be speckled with the various experiences of individuals. It cannot be held to be appearing as different in accordance with the variety of conditions through which it appears, for in our experiences we find that though through our various cognitive organs we have various experiences they are also emphasized as belonging to one being. Variability of conditions does not necessarily imply a variety of the units of experience of individual beings, as is maintained by the Sarkarites. The pure and ubiquitous differenceless consciousness (nirviseṣa-caitanya) cannot also be regarded as capable of being identified as one with the plurality of minds (antaḥkarana). Again, it is admitted by the Sankarites that in dreamless sleep the mind is dissolved. If that were so and if pure consciousness is regarded as being capable of manifesting itself through false identification with minds, there would be no explanation of the continuity of consciousness from day to day in the form of memory. It cannot be urged that such a continuity is maintained by the fact that minds exist in a state of potency (samskārā-tmanā vasthitasya) in the deep dreamless sleep; for the mind in a potent state cannot be regarded as carrying impressions and memories, since in that case there would be memories even in dreamless sleep.
