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466 The Philosophy of V’ijñāna Bhikṣu [CH. the nature of pure illumination, no special intuitive apprehension is necessary and that the existence of the mental function or vrtti was admitted for explaining the dissolution of ajñāna; for Brahman, being of the nature of consciousness, can be realized only through intuitive apprehension which is itself of the nature of knowledge. Since all apprehension is direct and immediate, self-knowledge must also be of the same kind. There is also no necessity to assume a principle of obstruction which has to be overcome as a condition of the rise of knowledge. In the state of deep dreamless sleep a principle of obstruction in the shape of the function of tamas has to be admitted in order to explain the absence of knowledge which leads to the absence of all cognitive or practical behaviour. To the opponent's idea that since Brahman is self-luminous it cannot have any relation with anything else, and that since Brahman and the self are identical there cannot be any self-knowledge of Brahman, for the Brahman cannot be both the knower and the known, Bhikṣu's reply is that self-luminousness does not mean unrelatedness; and the absolute identity of the self and the Brahman cannot also be admitted, and even if it be admitted we can explain the method of Brahma-knowledge by the same manner in which our experiential knowledge or self-consciousness can be explained.
Bhikṣu thinks that since we do not find in the Brahma-sūtras any account of the origin and growth of knowledge, the SāmkhyaYoga account of knowledge may well be accepted on account of the general affinity of the Sāmkhya-Yoga ideas with the Vedānta. According to the Sāmkhya-Yoga there is first a contact of the senses with their respective objects and as a result the tamas aspect of the buddhi is subordinated at the time; and the buddhi as pure sattva assumes the form of the object. This state of buddhi is called an objective state of the buddhi or a sensory idea or state (sā buddhyavasthā viṣayā-kārā buddhi-rịttir ity ucyate). During dreams and contemplative states images of external objects arise in the mind and are directly perceived and therefore valid. The connection of the purușa with the external objects is thus effected through the intermediary of the buddhi. So long as the buddhi remains impure the puruṣu cannot get itself related to objects through it. It is for this reason that during deep sleep when the buddhi is dominated by tamas the purușa-consciousness cannot manifest itself or make itself related with other objects. As soon as the buddhi is
