________________
610
Index
Venkata (cont.)
doubt, 208 et seq., decision, nature of, 210; definition of pramāna, 236; doubt and üha, 214; error, definition of, 210; error and doubt, relation, 208 et seq.; his agreement with the Pañcarătra view of God, 303; his admission of three pramūnas, 214; his admission of three types of illusion from three points of view, 241; his analysis of doubt, 211; his classification of doubt, 212-13; his conception of jāti, 355; his conception of sadrsya, 355: his criticisin of Bhāskara, 301; his criticism of Brahmadatta, 291; his criticism of Nyāya-sūtra and Prajñā-paritrāņa regarding doubt, 211; his criticism of Nyāya theory of doubt, 207; his criticism of Sāmkhya argument in favour of prakrti, 256 et seq.; his criticism of the avidyā, 330 et seq.; his criticism of the Sāmkhya view of God, 296; his criticism of the Sankara conception of the unity of self, 345; his criticism of the view that ajñāna is a positive entity, 327 et seq.; his criticism of the view that ajñana rests in the individual jīvas, 329; his criticism of the view that all effects are falsc owing to their contradiction, 341 et seq.; his criticism of the view that aridyā and māvā are different, 334 et seq.; his criticism of the view that Brahman is pure bliss, 344; his criticism of the view that consciousness cannot be produced, 321; his criticism of the view that consciousness is identical with self, 323 et seq.; his criticism of the view that consciousness is one, 322; his criticism of the view that emancipation is attained by right knowledge, 326; his criticism of the view that indeterminate Brahman could be eternal, 345; his criticism of the view that pure consciousness is sāksin, 325; his criticism of the view that pure consciousness is unqualified, 323; his criticism of the view that realization of monistic identity produces emancipation, 336 et seq.; his criticism of the view that scriptural testimony is superior to perception, 326; his criticism of the view that the notion of the self as knower is false, 325;
his criticism of the Yoga view of God, 296; his criticism of Yadava Prakasa, 302; his definition of perception, 216; his doctrine of emancipation, 292; his eschatological conception, 295; his life ard literature, 119-25; his Nyāya theory, refutation of, 262 et seq.; his relation of the view that consciousness is identical with self, 290; his refutation of Buddhist and Cārvāka theory of ākāsa, 282; his refutation of Buddhist doctrines of momentariness, 268 et seq.; his refutation of Cārvāka causality, 276; his refutation of contentless consciousness, 310-11; his refutation of different views of God, 302; his refutation of Kātyāyana's views of God, 302; his refutation of Samkhya-satkāryavāda, 265 et seq.; his refutation of nirvikalpajñāna, 311; his refutation of Sankara, 304 et seq.; his refutation of Sankara's theory of anubhūti, 31819; his refutation of Sriharsa's refutation of pramāna, 202; his refutation of the denial of production of individual cognitions, 319 et seq.; his refutation of the Buddhist denial of substance, 251 et seq.; his refutation of the denial of the category of difference, 312; his refutation of the doctrine of the all-pervasiveness of souls, 291; his refutation of the falsity of the world on the ground of validity, 313-14; his refutation of the falsity of the world on the ground of absence of relation between the perceiver and the perceived, 314 et seq.; his refutation of the Nyāya doctrine of the formation of whole from parts, 263 et seq.; his refutation of the possibility of jijñāsā according to Sankara's interpretation, 306; his refutation of the view of the reflection of Brahman under aridyā, 291; his refutation of the view that avidyā rests in Brahman, 317-18; his refutation of the view that perception refers to pure Being, 311; his refutation of the view that Brahman is qualityless, 306; his refutation of the view that the self-luminosity of Brahman is contentless, 316-17; his refutation of the view that the utterance of unity texts can lead to immediate perception, 308-10; his re
