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XXVII] Pramāṇas (ways of valid knowledge) 165 to be a pramāna. So pramāņa should be so defined that memory may be included within it. Chaļari-seşācārya quotes an unidentified scriptural text in support of the inclusion of memory in pramānal. Jaya-tīrtha, in a brief statement of the positive considerations which according to him support the inclusion of memory in pramāna, says that memory is true (yathārtha). When an object appears in consciousness to have a definite character in a particular time and at a particular place and has actually that character at that time and at that place, then this knowledge is true or yathārtha. Now memory gives us exactly this sort of knowledge; "it was so there at that time." It is not the fact that at that time it was not so. Memory is directly produced by the manas, and the impressions (samskāra) represent its mode of contact with the object. ] through the impressions that mind comes in contact with specific objects (samskāras tu manasas tad-artha-sannikarşa-rūpa eva). It may be objected that, the object referred to by memory having undergone many changes and ceased in the interval to exist in its old state, the present memory cannot take hold of its object; the answer is that the objection would have some force if manas, unaided by any other instrument, were expected to do it; but this is not so. Just as the sense-organs, which are operative only in the present, may yet perform the operation of recognition through the help of the impressions (samskāra), so the manas also may be admitted to refer by the help of the impressions to an object which has changed its previous state?
The conception of pramāņa is considered a subject of great importance in Indian philosophy. The word pramāṇa is used principally in two different senses, (i) as a valid mental act, as distinguished from the invalid or illusory cognitions; (ii) as the instruments or the collocations of circumstances which produce knowledge. Some account of pramāņa in the latter sense has already been given in Vol. 1, pp. 330-2. The conflicting opinions regarding the interpretation of pramāna as instruments of know
smrtih pratyakşam aitihyam anumānacatuştayam pramāņam iti vijñeyam dharmādy-arthe mumuksubhiḥ.
Pramāņa-candrikā, p. 4. 2 samskāra-sahakrtam manah ananubhūtām api niurtta-purvāvasthăm visayıkurvat smaranam janayet iti ko doşah; vartamāna-visayāņi api indriyāņi sahakarisāmarthyāt kālāntara-sambandhitām api gocarayanti; yathā sarskära-sahakytāni soyam ity atīta-vartamānatva-višistavişayapratyabhijñā-sādhanāni prākrtendriyani mano-vrtti-jñānam janayanti. Pramāna-paddhati, p. 24.
