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XXVII] Pramānas (ways of valid knowledge) 167 here to be the essence of pramā, that jñāna, or the inner revelation of knowledge, is regarded as its instrument or pramāna and the external physical instruments or accessories to the production of knowledge noted by the Nyāya are discarded. It is the selfrevelation of knowledge that leads immediately to the objective reference and objective determination, and the collocation of other accessories (sākalya or sāmagri) can lead to it only through knowledgel. Knowledge alone can therefore be regarded as the most direct and immediately preceding instrument (sādhakatama). For similar reasons the Jains reject the Sāmkhya view of pramāna as the functioning of the senses (aindriya-vịtti) and the Prabhākara view of pramāna as the operation of the knower in the knowing process beneath the conscious level2.
It is interesting to note in this connection that the Buddhist view on this point, as explained by Dharmottara, came nearer the Jain view by identifying pramāna and pramāņa-phala in jñāna ("knowledge"). Thus by pramāna Dharmottara understands the similarity of the idea to the object, arising out of the latter's influence, and the idea or jñāna is called the pramāņa-phala, though the similarity of the idea to the object giving rise to it is not different from the idea itself. The similarity is called here pramāna, because it is by virtue of this similarity that the reference to the particular object of experience is possible; the knowledge of blue is possibly only by virtue of the similarity of the idea to the blue.
The Madhva definition of pramāņa as yathārtham pramānam means that by which an object is made known as it is. The instrument which produces it may be external sense-contact and the like, called here the anupramāna corresponding to the sāmagri of the Nyāya, and the exercise of the intuitive function of the intuitive sense (kevala pramāna) of sākṣī, which is identical with self. Thus it combines in a way the subjective view of Prabhākara and the Jains and the objective view of the Nyāya.
1 For other Jain arguments in refutation of the samagri theory of pramāna in the Nyāya see Prameya-kamala-märtanda, pp. 2-4.
? etenendriya-vrttih pramānam ity abhidadhänaḥ sāmkhyaḥ pratyākhyātaḥ... etena Prabhäkaro'py artha-tathātva-prakāśako jñāty-vyāpāro'jñāna-rūpo'pi pramaņam iti pratipadayan prativyūdhaḥ patipattavyaḥ. Ibid. p. 6.
3 yadi tarhi jñānam pramiti-rūpatvāt pramāņa-phalam kim tarhi pramānam ity aha; arthena saha yat sārupyam sādrśyam asya jñānasya tat pramānam iha... nanu ca jñānād avyatiriktam sādrśyam: tathā ca sati tad eva jñānam pramānam tad eva pramāna-phalam. Nyāya-bindu-tikā, p. 18.
