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XXVIII) Tarka (Ratiocination)
193 accepted views, we may have a notion of concomitance without going through the process of tarka. He seems, however, to be largely in agreement with the view of tarka as held by Gangesa according to the above statement of Vardhamāna, in holding that tarka does not lead directly to the establishment of concomitance. For he says that tarka does not directly lead us to the establishment of concomitance, since concomitance is directly grasped by a wide experience (bhūyo-darśana) of coexistence, qualified by a knowledge of absence of failure of coexistence?. Vācaspati also holds more or less the same view when he says that it is the sense-organ, aided by the memory of wide experience, that grasps this natural relation of concomitance?. Vyāsa-tirtha says that the determination of absence of vitiating conditions (upādhi), which is a function of tarka, becomes necessary only in some kinds of inference; it is not always awaited. If it were always necessary, then tarka being required for all notions of concomitance and concomitance being the basis of tarka, there would be a vicious infinite3. If failures of coexistence are not known, then from cases of coexistence the self may immediately form the notion of concomitance. What is necessary therefore is to dispel the doubts as to failure of coexistence (vyabhicārasankā-nivștti-dvāra). But such doubts come only occasionally (kvacitkaiva) and not always; and such occasional doubts require to be dispelled by only an occasional recourse to tarka. It cannot be argued that the possibility of doubts may remain in all cases and hence in all cases there is necessity for the exercise of the tarka; for it may well be asked, do such doubts arise of themselves in our minds or are they raised by others? On the first supposition one may have doubts even as to the perception of one's hands and feet, or one might even have doubts in regard to one's doubts, which would render even the doubts invalid. If it is held that doubts arise only when other possible alternatives are suggested, then it has to be agreed that there will be many cases where no such
i api ca tarko na sākşād vyāpti-grāhakaḥ bhūyo-darśana-vyabhicărādarśanasahakyta-pratyakşenaiva tad-grahaņāt. Tarka-tāndava (MS., p. 20).
2 bhūyo-darśana-janita-samskāra-sahitam indriyam eva svābhāvika-sambandha-grāhi. Tātparya-ţikā.
* This has already been pointed out above in dealing with Sriharşa's objections.
adrste vyabhicăre tu sādhakam tad ati sphutam jñāyate sāksiņaivāddhā mānavadho na tad bhavet.
Tarka-tāndava (MS., p. 21).
