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202 Madhva Logic
[CH. own mind of itself, and secondly parārtha, where such a knowledge is for the instruction of others. As regards the constituent propositions (avayava) of inference, Vyāsa-tirtha discusses the tenproposition view of older Nyāya writers (jaran-naiyāyika), also the five-proposition view of the later Nyāya writers', the three-proposition view of the Mimāmsā, and also the two-proposition view of example and the application of reason (udāharanopanayar) of the Buddhists. Vyāsa-tirtha urges that, since the value of these constituent propositions consists in reminding persons of a particular concomitance or in rousing an enquiry in those who did not know it before, there is necessity only for as many propositions as are necessary for the purpose, in accordance with the circumstances under which the inference is being made or the state of mind of the person who makes it so that there may be cases where only the enunciating proposition, reason and example are necessary, there may be cases where only the enunciating proposition combined with the reason is necessary (agni-vyāpta-dhūmavān parvato'gnimān iti hetu-garbha-pratijña), or, when in certain cases the discussion presupposes the enunciating proposition, only the reason may be necessary, and so on. So there is no fixed rule as to the number of constituent propositions necessary for inference; it all depends upon the nature of the case whether two, three or more propositions are necessary.
Both Jaya-tirtha and Vyāsa-tirtha devote a long discussion to the division of fallacies (upapatti-dosa) and criticize the Nyāya division of the same; but, as these have but little philosophical bearing, I feel inclined to omit them.
Testimony. Madhva and his followers admitted only three kinds of means of knowledge, namely, perception, inference, and the testimony of the Vedas. All other kinds of means of knowledge (pramāna) admitted in other systems, such as arthāpatti, sambhava, etc., are shown to be but modes of inference. The Vedas are regarded as having by
jijñāsā-samsaya-sakya-prāptih prayojana-samsayanirāsāh pratijña-hetūdāharanopanaya-nigamanāni iti daśāvayavā iti jaran-naiyāyikā āhuh. Tarka-tandava.
? vivādenaiva pratijñā-siddhau kutah parvato'gniman iti prašne agni-vyāptadhūmavattvād iti hetu-mātrena vä. Tarka-tandava (MS., p. 1o).
3 See Pramāņa-paddhati, pp. 48–79; also Tarka-tandava (MS., pp. 114 et seq.). · Pramāna-paddhati, pp. 86-90.
