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CH. XXIX] On the Falsity of the World
205 theory of extreme monism would break down (nişedhasya tattrikatve advaita-hāniḥ); if the denial is false or true only in a limited manner (vyāvahārika), then the world-appearance would become true. Again, what does the denial actually mean? These supposed appearances are said to be produced from a material cause, and they are perceived as existing at the time of perception; and, if it is held that even then they have no existence at all as such, then they must be absolutely without being, like the chimerical hare's horn. If it is held that the difference of the world-appearance from chimerical entities like the hare's horn, etc., is that they are absolutely indescribable, then the reply is that the very term "indescribable" describes their nature. Again, that which is absolutely nonexisting cannot in any way appear in knowledge (asataḥ a-pratītav), and therefore it is not possible to make reference to it or to relate it in any way to anything else. The Sankarites themselves hold that what is non-existing cannot appear in knowledge (asac cet na pratiyeta), and thus they themselves deny the possibility of any being-in-knowledge of that which is non-existing. Again, reality is not the same as mere appearance in knowledge, and consequently, if Brahman remained always uncontradicted in knowledge, its reality could not on that ground be affirmed. Again, it is not true that words denoting absolutely non-existing and chimerical things, such as the hare's horn, produce no knowledge; for they also produce some notion; the difference between ordinary illusions and the chimerical entities is this that, while the ground of the ordinary illusions is right and valid, chimerical entities have no ground at all. Therefore, since chimerical entities can also be made objects of awareness they appear in knowledge as non-existing. The Vedic text “non-being alone existed in the beginning” (asad eva idam agre āsīt) also testifies to the fact that “non-being" may appear as existent. Also non-being cannot be defined as that which is different from mere “being” (sat) and "the indescribable" (a-nirvācya); for the latter can only be understood through the concept of non-being and vice versa. Thus non-being may be defined as that which is different from that being which cannot at all times be denied at all places (sārvatrika-traikālika-nişedha-pratiyogitva-rūpa-sadanyasyaiva tattvāc ca). If the indescribable (a-nirvācya) is defined as that which can be denied at all times, it is the same as non-being itself. Also non-being cannot be defined
