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XXVII] Pramāņas (ways of valid knowledge) 163 experience. If it is argued that the object of previous knowledge changes its state and so cannot in its entirety be referred to as the object of memory, then that destroys the validity of all pramāṇas; for nothing can be made an object of all the pramāṇas in its entirety. Also it cannot be objected that, if the thing does not change its state, then memory should grasp it as an entity which has not changed its state. This is not valid either; for memory does not grasp an object as if it had not changed its state, but as “it was so at that time” (tadāsan tadựsa iti). Memory is absolutely indifferent with regard to the question whether an object has changed its state or not. Since memory agrees with real objective facts it has to be considered valid, and it is the special feature of the present definition that it includes memory as a valid definition, which is not done in other systems. The validity of memory as a pramāna is proved by the fact that people resort to it as valid knowledge in all their dealings, and only right knowledge is referred to by men (lokavyavahāra). There is no way of establishing the validity of the pramāṇas of perception, etc., except the ultimate testimony of universal human experience1.
Moreover, even the validity of the sacred writings of Manu is based on the remembered purport of the Vedas, and thence they are called smặtia. Again, the argument that memory has no validity because it does not bring us any fruit (nisphalā) is not right; for the validity depends on correctness of correspondence and not on fruitfulness. Want of validity (aprāmānya) is made evident through the defect of the organs or the resulting contradiction (bādhakapratyaya). It may also be noted that memory is not absolutely fruitless; thus the memory of happy things is pleasant and strengthens the root impressions also (samskāra-patana). Again, it is argued that that alone could be called pramāna which involves the knowledge of something new, and that therefore memory, which does not involve new knowledge, cannot be counted as pramāņa. If it is required that an object of knowledge should be pramāna, then the eternal entities about which there cannot be any new knowledge cannot be the objects of pramāņa. If the require
1 na hy asti pratyakşādi-prāmānya-sādhakam anyad loka-vyavahārāt. Nyāya-sudhā, II. 1. 2 adhikarana, p. 251.
te hi śrutyādināmubhūtārtham smặtvā tat-fratipădakam grantham āracayati. Ibid. p. 252.
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