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162 A Review of the Philosophy of Madhva [ch. includes memory (smrti) of previous valid experience as valid, whereas most of the other systems of Indian philosophy are disposed so to form their definition as purposely to exclude the right of memory to be counted as pramānal. Sālikaņātha's argument, as given in his Prakarana-pañeikā, on the rejection of memory from the definition of pramāna is based on the fact that memory is knowledge produced only by the impressions of previous knowledge (pūrva-vijñāna-samskāra-mātrajam jñānam); as such, it depends only on previous knowledge and necessarily refers to past experience, and cannot therefore refer independently to the ascertainment of the nature of objects. He excludes recognition (pratyabhijñā) from memory, as recognition includes in its data of origin direct sense contact; and he also excludes the case of a series of perceptions of the same object (dhārā-vähika jñāna); for though it involves memory, it also involves direct sense contact, but the exclusion of memory from the definition of pramāna applies only to pure memory, unasscciated with sense contact. The idea is that that which depends on or is produced only by previous knowledge does not directly contribute to our knowledge and is hence not pramāna.
The reason why Jaya-tirtha urges the inclusion of memory is that memory may also agree with an object of knowledge and hence may rightly be called pramāna. It may be that, while I am remembering an object, it may not still be there or it may have ceased to exist, but that does not affect the validity of memory as pramāna, since the object did exist at the time of previous experience referred to by memory, though it may not be existing at the time when the memory is produced. If it is argued that, since the object is not in the same condition at the time of memory as it was at the time of experience, memory is not valid, in that case all knowledge about past and future by inference or scriptures would be invalid, since the past and future events inferred might not exist at the time of
1 Here Jaya-tirtha refers to the definitions of the Mimāmsā as anadhigatārthagantr pramānam and as anubhūtih pramānam. The first refers to Kumārila's definition and the second to that of Prabhākara. Kumārila defines pramāna (as found in the Codanā-sūtra 80, Sloka-r'ārttika) as firm knowledge (drdham vijñānam) produced (utpannam) and unassociated with other knowledge (näpi jñānāntarena samvādam rcchati). The second definition is that of Prabhākara as quoted in Salikanātha's Prakarana-pancikā, p. 42: pramānam anubhūtih.
? smrtir hi tad-ity-upajājamānā prācīm pratītim anuradhyamāna na svätantryena artham paricchinatti iti na pramānam. Prakarana-pañcikā, p. 42.
