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XXVII] Ontology
155 (kāraṇa-sakti or sahaja-sakti), which naturally exists in things and by virtue of which they can produce all sorts of changes, (iii) a power brought about by a new operation in a thing called the ādheya-sakti, as in an idol through the ritual operations of the installation ceremony (pratisthā), and (iv) the significant power of words (pada-sakti). Negation is said to be of three kinds: (i) the negation preceding a production (prāg-abhāva), (ii) that following destruction (dhvamsābhāva), (iii) as otherness (anyonyābhāva), e.g., there is the negation of a jug in a pot and of a pot in a jug: this is therefore the same as differences, which are considered as the essence of all things. When things are destroyed, their differences are also destroyed. But the five differences between God and souls, between souls themselves, between inanimate objects themselves, between them and God, and between them and the souls, are all eternal; for the differences in eternal things are eternal and in noneternal things non-eternal. The fourth kind of negation, atyantābhāva, is the non-existence belonging to impossible entities like the hare's horn.
God, or Paramātman, is in this system considered as the fullness of infinite qualities. He is the author of creation, maintenance, destruction, control, knowledge, bondage, salvation, and hiding (āvrti). He is omniscient, and all words in their most pervading and primary sense refer to Him. He is different from all material objects, souls and prakrti, and has for His body knowledge and bliss, and is wholly independent and one, though He may have diverse forms (as in Vāsudeva, Pradyumna, etc.); all such forms of Him are the full manifestation of all His qualities.
The souls (jiva) are naturally tainted with defects of ignorance, sorrow, fear, etc., and they are subject to cycles of transformation.
They are infinite in number. They are of three kinds, viz., those who are fit for emancipation (mukti-yogya), e.g., gods such as Brahmā, Vāyu, etc., or sages, like Nārada, etc., or like the ancestors (pits), or kings like Ambarīša, or advanced men; these advanced
1 bhedas tu sarva-vastūnām svarūpam naijam avyayam. Ibid. p. 20.
* Jaya-tirtha, however, in his Nyāya-sudhā, 1. 4.6 (adhikarana, p. 222), holds that differences (whether in eternal or in non-eternal things) are always eternal: na ca kadāpi padārthānām anyonya-tādātmyam asti iti anityānām api bhedo nitya eva ity āhuh. Padmanābha-tirtha also in his San-nyāya-ratnāvali or Anuvyākhyāna holds exactly the same view on the same topic (1. 4. 6): vināśino'pi ghațāder dharma-rūpo bhedaḥ para-vady-abhyupagataghatatvādi-jātivan nityo'bhyupagantazyah.
