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124 Madhva's Interpretation of the Brahma-sūtras [CH. to, and devoid of all reference to, any other thing cannot be known (svarūpasya sva-vedyatvāt). It is further held by the opponents that an accidental defining characteristic like that of the Brahman being the cause of the world (tațastha-laksaņa)-as, for example, indicating a house by a temporary association, as that of a crow sitting on the roof of it-is not an inherent and intrinsic characteristic (ananvayi), whereas an essential characteristic like ānanda is an inherent and intrinsic constituent (kāryānvayi) of the thing. But such an objection cannot rule out the causality, etc., of Brahman as being inessential; for we want to know Brahman in its essence as the cause or kārana of the world, as much as by any other characteristic. The essential feature of Brahınan is its fullness of qualities, as the ultimate cause of production, etc., and these are in no sense less essential than His nature as ānanda. Like the power of burning in fire, these powers of world-creation, etc., are coextensive with the essence of Brahman. It is indeed surprising, says Vyāsa-tīrtha, that the Sankarites should enter into any long discussion with regard the distinction of essential and accidental definitions; for all definitions mean the making known of object by its distinctive characteristics such as are well known?. But, as the Sankarites believe in absolutely unqualified Brahman, how do they undertake to define it? All definitions must proceed through the means of known qualities. Whether a definition (lakṣaṇa) be svarūpa or taţastha, it must proceed by way of enumerating distinctive characteristic qualities; and, as the Brahman of the opponents has no qualities, it cannot be defined at all.
Rāmānuja in his interpretation of this sūtra asserted that the characteristic qualities and powers of Brahman referred to in the sūtra belong to Brahman as He is immanent; but the Upanişads also define Him in His essential characteristic features, as transcendent, by speaking of Him as being truth, knowledge, the infinite (satyam jñānam anantam brahma); and this distinguishes Him from the souls and inanimate objects, which also are held within Him. But Vyāsa-tīrtha points out that Madhva has by implication denied this in his Anuvyākhyāna, where he distinctly asserted the causality of
prasiddhasya asādhārana-dharmasya laksanatvena; also asādhārana-dharmo hi laksanam parikīrtyate. Tātparya-candrikā, pp. 140, 143.
svarüpam vă tatastham vă laksanam bhedakam matam sajātīyād vijātiyāt tac-cădvaiti-mate katham. Ibid. p. 143.
